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have   improved   the   efficiency,   the   transparency   or   the   accountability   of   local 
government
The investigation of the executive mayoral option employed an analytical framework 
to   measure   change   on   three   dimensions   of   efficiency,   transparency   and 
accountability.  To aid the investigation seven hypotheses were constructed from the 
government’s  White  Papers   to   explore   various  aspects   of  executive  mayors  and 
assist in providing generalisable conclusions about the introduction of directly elected 












lead   in   administration   and   management.     In   addition,   executive   mayors   have 
developed a  better  capability   to   challenge professional  officers.    The strength  of 
executive  mayors  as   leaders  within   their   local  authorities  over   the  policy  making 




















































































































































































































































With   this   short   statement   seven   returning   officers   in   Doncaster,   Hartlepool, 
Lewisham, Middlesbrough, Newham, North Tyneside and Watford, made an historic 
announcement on Friday 3 May 2002 that their voters had chosen one of the first 
directly  elected mayors  for  an English  local  authority.    The announcement  of   the 
winners  also   gave   cause   for   concern   to   the  Labour  Party,  which  had   been   the 





















and   the  subsequent  White  Paper:  Modern  Local  Government:   In  Touch  with   the  







What  is significant  is  that  the final  reforms enacted after 1997 are the product of 
several decades of debate about the nature of local government, which produced a 
journey   from collective,   committee  based decision­making  to  a   form of   individual 
executive   leadership   and   decision­making   (Maud   1967:41,  Widdicombe   1985:92, 
DETR 1998g:21 and 23, DETR 1999:14,16, s11 LGA 2000).   The narrative of this 




solutions   to  what   it  assessed as  being  the   ills  of  English   local  government.  The 
difference such mayors were to make was not so much in what mayors themselves 
could do or achieve, but more by the way of acting as an antidote to the problems 





having   prominent   individuals   set   the   council's   overall   strategy   and   act   as   the 
supreme, possibly the sole, decision maker and hence be a key locus of power.  The 
individual  would also be  the council  or  area's representative  in other parts of  the 
governance matrix and whether acting as an ambassador or a reticulist. the executive 
mayor would be exercising power, though probably indirectly, through influence and 




Being   directly   elected   by   all   the   residents   of   the   local   authority,   through   the 
Supplementary Vote system, executive mayors would enjoy greater legitimacy than 
indirectly elected council   leaders.   Moreover,  the executive mayor's election by all 
voters would ensure that the English institution was significantly different from some 
European countries where the executive mayor is usually the head of a winning party 
list as  in  the case of  Italy (Baldini  2002:367) or France where the councillors are 
usually bound to vote for a pre­determined mayoral candidate (Kerrouche 2005:153). 
Lastly, since they were also likely to be the most visible decision­maker, executive 














aspects   which   are   examined   in   detail   throughout   the   thesis   and   highlights   the 
‘political  differences’ that could be found as a result of the introduction of elected 
mayors   into  a   locality.    Evidence  will   be   sought  of   how executive  mayors  might 
provide a visible,   identifiable and accountable “face”  for  the  local  authority,  which 
would contrast with the anonymity associated with indirectly elected council leaders. 
In addition to this, the section will outline the tensions between elected mayors, their 





In   section   three   the   scope   of   the   thesis   will   be   defined   and   the  methodology 
employed will be set out.   The section will show how qualitative methods, such as 
interview   and   documentary   analysis   augmented   with   quantitative   data   where 
relevant,   such   as   election   results,   will   be   employed.     From   these   explanations, 
section four will develop the core hypotheses to be tested to illustrate the means by 





























1 A council elected by thirds will have local elections three years out of every four.  In 
some cases the fourth year is used for mayoral elections, but not in all instances.
5
differences  can  be  attributed   to   the   introduction  of   the  directly  elected  executive 
mayor?
In addition to  the mayoral  victor,  consideration will  be given  to the  impact on the 
balance   of   the   political   parties   on   the   councils   concerned,   a   balance   which   is 
important as the executive mayor can only draw his or her cabinet appointees from 
the ranks of councillors (s.11 LGA 2000).   Since at least one third of the councillors 
have   to   approve   the  mayor's   budget   and   corporate  plan,   or   if   two   thirds  of   the 
councillors   vote   in  agreement  even   impose  a  budget   on   the  mayor,   the  political  
balance on the council is important.  Here it was observed that a number of formerly 
Labour Party dominated councils have changed completely with the Conservatives 





Change of  political  power,   therefore,  can not  simply  be  attributed  to   the  mayoral 
model, although it may well have accelerated the change.
Furthermore,  since  the  thesis  is   investigating  the political  difference made by  the 
introduction of executive mayors in England, it is crucial to understand who was being 




for  the election of the Mayor of London2.     It  will  be noted that  in  three cases SV 
produced different outcomes than what the more widely used single member plurality 
2 The Mayor of London heads the Greater London Authority, a strategic body outside the 
scope of the thesis.
6
system would have achieved.   Not only were these results different to the outcome 
that   a   traditional   single   member   plurality   system   as   used   for   MPs   and   some 
councillors would have produced,  in nearly 60% of the elections there were more 
unused  or   spoilt   second  preference   votes   than   the   victor's  majority.    Hence   the 
operation of the electoral system, particularly its requirement that electors accurately 
assess which  candidates  are going  to  come  first  and second on  first  preference 
votes, could have an undue  impact  in shaping who wins, rather  than acting as a 
neutral   system   for   translating   electors'   preferences.    Given   that   one   of   the   key 
functions of an election is to produce a victor whose legitimacy is accepted by those 
who did not vote for them and those who did (Blais and Gélineau 2007:427), such a 
degree   of   uncertainty   requires   more   detailed   analysis.     As   part   of   this   study, 




be exercising a representative role.    Rao and Young (1999:60)  provided an early 
indication of   this  possible  effect  as  their  survey noted  that  59% believed  that  an 
executive mayor would speak for the whole area.   The ability of the local authority 
leader to speak on behalf of a wider audience was noted by the Lyons Inquiry:











and  was   changed  by   central   government   into  a  unitary   authority   (SI   2008/907). 
There was no referendum of local people to determine if this was desired, contrary to 
the   popular   vote   necessary   to   create   the   executive   mayoralty.     Given   the 





than  by   the  majority   party  group,  an  exploration  of  how  executive  mayors  were 
exercising their role within the council, would illuminate political differences the office 
was  making     Evidence   of   an   impact   would   be   observed   if,   in   all   the  mayoral 
authorities, a shift in the balance of power between the executive mayor and the chief 
executive,  between  the  executive  mayor,   the  chief  officers  and  the  non­executive 
councillors on each council occurred.   Such a finding would be underpinned if non­












straightforward hence  the need  for  a  detailed comparative analysis  of   the eleven 
mayoral authorities to measure any differences more accurately.  The question here 
is   about   the   balance   of   power   between   mayor   and   council   and   the   effect   of 
constitutional checks and balances on the mayor's authority to act. 













within each  local  authority.    Given  that  both Conservative (Heseltine) and Labour 
(Blair)   politicians   had   highlighted   this   strong   decision­making   role,   it   could   be 
expected that the previous collective, committee­based, public decision­taking model 
condemned in the White Paper (DETR 1998g:10) would be replaced by something 
different.    In other words, we could expect to see a shift   from collective decision­
making   in   committee   to   a   continuum   of   individualistic,   consensual,   collegiate 










If  power  is  displayed  through decision­making and prompting action – or causing 
inaction – then how mayors make decisions becomes an obvious focus for attention. 
Two   types   of   decision­making   settings   were   considered   so   as   to   provoke   a 
comparison between normal and exceptional circumstances.  Firstly, to see if mayors 
acted   differently   in   different   circumstances  and   secondly   to   understand   how   the 












quasi­ministerial   role   almost   as   acting   chief   executives?     Alternatively,   would 
executive mayors have a similar public relations role that might be expected of an 
10











its   lack  of  uptake  and  undermine   its  chance of  achieving  what   it  was set  up   to 
achieve?     Initially,   the  evidence   indicated   that   the   idea  might   have  popular   and 
political  support.    As  will  be  seen  in  detail   in  chapter   two  the  mayoral   idea had 
backers, albeit with different agendas, in the two major British political parties and it 
had support from academics and interest groups, for example Stoker and Wolman 




as  a  possible  site   for  mayoral  government,  only  Middlesbrough had  adopted   the 









the  key powers  allocated  to  executive  mayors and  their   indirectly  elected council 
leader alternatives.
Nevertheless,   political   interest   in   the  mayoral   idea   has   persisted.     In   2009   the 
Conservative  Party,   perhaps   inspired   by   its   victory   in   the  2008  London  mayoral 
election,  included a proposal   to offer executive mayors to 12 of England's  largest 
cities  (Conservative Party  2009:21).    The Labour Government  continued  to make 
references   to   elected  mayors   and   in   the  Communities   in   Control  White   Paper 







Mayor   of   London  has  also  been  excluded   from   the   thesis   since   the  GLA  is   'A 
























Table  1   (p13)  summarises   the  some of  variations  between  the  elected executive 





































































































































































4 Most elections were in May or October 2002, Torbay held its first on October 2005, 
http://www.torbay.gov.uk/index/council/electedmayor.htm
5 On 1 April 2009 Bedford BC became a unitary authority
6 http://www.bedford.gov.uk/council_and_democracy/elections/mayoral_election_results_  
2009.aspx  By-election 15 October 2009
7 Linda Arkley was first elected in a by-election in 2003, lost the mayoralty in 2005 and 
regained it in 2009.
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Methodology and Research Strategy
To  research   the  political  differences  made by   the   introduction  of  directly  elected 
executive mayors, the thesis has followed a predominantly qualitative approach using 













local   authority   officers   and   a   number   of   other   politicians   where   available. 
Observations   of   some   cabinet   and   full   council   meetings   were   undertaken   and 
documentary evidence from the local authorities was examined in depth, particularly 
cabinet   minutes   and   reports,   constitutions   and   other   governance   documents 
(Burnham et al 2004:165­189).  
To   use   the   case   study   approach   effectively,   it   is   necessary   to   answer   the   key 
question (Ragin and Becker 1992:1­16, Collier 1995:465):  'of what is this a case?' 
Since the thesis is concerned with the political difference made by the introduction of 
8 As set out in May 1993:91-109, Robson 1993:159,227-266 , Christians 2000:133-143, 




generate action or  activity  has been noted by Burns (1978:20)  and developed by 
Stone (1995:108­109).   It was noticeable from the government's White Papers that 
“leadership” was a central theme (Hartley and Allison 2005:35) with 32 references to 
it   in   the 1998 White  Paper  (DETR1998g:passim),  a   further  27  in   the 1999 White 
Paper, including the title (DETR 1999:passim) and 49 in 2001, again, including the 


















style   of   government   on   the   overall  measure   of   each   council's   performance,   the 




provide reliable statistical   inferences (King  et al  1994:24, Geddes 2003:215, John 
2005:5).   Hence an approach known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)9  is 
employed, which measures change in dichotomous variables and employs Boolean 
logic   to  produce   results   that   enable   the   researcher   to   assess,  with  a  degree  of  




different  mayoral  authorities,   their   constitutional  powers  and  their  Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment ratings.
Additionally,  given  that  one of   the distinct  qualities of  executive mayors was  their 
election by the voters of an area and not just indirectly by councillors, it was possible 
to   conduct   a   quantitative   analysis   of   the   election   results.     Here   there   will   be 
opportunities   to   compare  executive  mayoral   elections  with  council   elections  and, 
owing  to   the   large population  of   the   latter;   these  findings will  also  be subject   to 
appropriate   tests   for   statistical   significance.    Having  adopted  a  methodology,   the 
research question can now be broken down into a series of hypotheses to allow for 
more detailed consideration.
















mayors  are  operating  and addressing   the   three deficits.    The desire   to   raise   the 
legitimacy of local government through executive mayors will be considered in detail 
in chapter five, where the electoral system including the responses of the political 










political  difference   is   facilitated  by   the  use  of  hypotheses   that  develop   the   three 
deficits and allow for a more detailed comparative analysis (Landman 2000:6­10). 




hypotheses  will   be   tested   in   chapters   five,   six   and   seven  where   the   data  most 
relevant to them is presented.  The first set of data examined in chapter five relates to 
the conduct of the election campaigns and the operation of the electoral system.  In  
chapter   six   there   is  a   specific  hypothesis   relating   to   the  allocation  of   powers   to 



















calls   into  doubt  any  positive  difference  being  made.    Equally,   these  hypotheses, 
particularly H2, could produce confirmation that executive mayors are overcoming the 
legitimacy deficit.  Since there are still local councillors and mayors may belong to the 
same  party   as   the  majority   of   them,  hypothesis  H3  extends   the   investigation  of 
legitimacy to see if there has been a political change in the balance of councillors on 
each mayoral authority.
H4 Executive mayors with   two or  more of   the  three powers  (solo decision 
making, choosing cabinet members and allocating portfolios) will be shown by 
the Comprehensive Performance Assessment to be “improving well”.




H5  null  The  leadership  of  a  mayoral  authority  during  an  emergency  will   be 
carried out by council officers, not the elected mayor.
Hypothesis H4 uses as a starting point the three powers adopted by the government 
sponsored ELGNCE evaluation  of   the   impact  of   the  Local  Government  Act  2000 
reforms – the power to make solo decisions, appoint cabinet members and assign 




different   combinations  of   the   three  powers  have  an   impact   on  government.     To 
explore how these powers might  be used  in an extreme situation,  hypothesis  H5 
examines the extent to which the executive mayor has additional freedom to act in a 
crisis.




H7:   The   conduct   of   the  mayoral   cabinet   will   be   different   from   pre­Local 


















that   were   derived   from   them.     Chapter   two   commences   by   establishing   the 
chronological context in which the executive mayoral concept finally emerged onto 
the   statute  books   and   into  English   local   government   practice.    Establishing   this 
context   will   assist   in   creating   the   framework   to   understand   the   government's 
objectives from introducing elected mayors.   Appreciating why the change was not 










Chapter   three   will   review   leadership   theories,   which   are   significant   since   they 
incorporate a range of studies of UK and US local political leaders and provide a 
number of comparative typologies that may be adapted for the present study.  Given 































'...provide   an   important   means   of   enabling   citizens   and   stakeholders   to  
understand how the council makes decisions and who is responsible for those  
decisions. (DETR 2001:6)













meetings.     If  executive mayors are  to be accountable,   these meetings should be 
facilitating this process and hence be illustrating a political difference from having the 
new office  of  executive  mayor.    These meetings,  which  are open  to   the  public10, 





10  There is a provision under 1972 LGA for individual agenda items to be dealt with in 
private session but these items are restricted to matters dealing with contracts under 
negotiation or when privacy must be respected.
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Chapters   eight   and   nine   contain   the   case   studies,  which  may   illustrate   political 
differences.   In order to derive the maximum amount of explanation from the case 












Moreover,  whereas Hackney had  experienced a  period  of  a  council  with  no  one 
political   party   having   a  majority,  Middlesbrough   had   retained   the   same   political 
control, the Labour group, with a majority both before and after the change to the 






noteworthy.     The  diverse  experiences  observed  make   the  phenomenon  of   great 
interest still.  There are also opportunities to develop the research to augment wider 
















of  the mayor as the  local  authority's political   leader  is not new.   Even before the 




mayor  as   the  political   leader   remained   in   the  Twentieth  Century,  as  Mayor  Pipe 




















the   form of  government   is  still  deemed  to be a valid  option  by politicians or   the 
community.  If it is, it remains in “the garbage can”, in Cohen et al's (1972:2) phrase, 






since  decisions   taken   some  distance   in   time   from  an   event   are   still   capable  of 




bring about,   the chapter's  first  section will  consider  the evolution of  the executive 
mayoral concept in its British context from the mid 1960s onwards.  It is accepted that 















namely   that  of  ensuring   that   local  councils  did  not  embarrass  or  undermine   the 
Labour government.  Having seized upon this concept, the impact of the failure of the 
rest of central  government  to  follow through with the policy and the reluctance of 
Ministers to use their reserve powers to compel councils to hold referendums offering 
residents an executive mayor, will be considered.  Reference will be made to a few of 




indirectly   elected   leader­cabinet   system.     To   commence,   the   investigation   will 



















Act  (LGA 1972),   the  Bains  Report  modified   this  concept  by  advocating  a  strong 
central committee, a policy and resources committee, but its remit was to asses and 
inform rather than to determine.  As the Report stated:
'In   order   to   take   those   decisions   the   Council   needs   comprehensive   and  
coordinated advice on the implications for the community and we believe that  





















One example  of   this  came  in  Regan's   (1980:19)   inaugural  professorial   lecture   in 
which he developed  the views of  John Stuart  Mill   (1991:272)  and argued  for   the 
creation of a single executive political leader, albeit one who was indirectly elected by 
other councillors rather than directly elected by the voters.   Regan also pre­empted 
later criticisms of  local  government by identifying the accountability deficit   in  local 
government that arose from the lack of a readily identifiable council leader stating: 







Heseltine   reached  was   that   the  major   cities   lacked   leadership  and   for   him   the 












committee   system  were   already   being   contemplated.     The   interest   in   executive 
mayors was located primarily in central government as a review of the Conservative 
Party  archives,  particularly  of   the   internal  monthly  political  discussion  documents 
Talking Politics, did not reveal any examples of discussions about how the political 
management of local councils should be changed.12  
After   the Conservative government was re­elected  in  1992 a second consultation 
paper was published repeating the option of directly elected mayors as a form of local  
government,  although  the  idea was not  developed  into  legislation (DoE 1993:38). 




had  written  'Parliament   cannot   be   equated  with   local   government.     Democratic  
11  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/727824.stm
12 Not all the documentation in the archive was made available because of a 30 year 










local   party   activists,   councillors   were   often   in   a   position   to   lobby   the   local 
Conservative MP, where there was one13.  
The antipathy towards executive mayors was shared by councillors in other parties 
and  in   response  to  a  parliamentary  question   in  1996,   the   then  local  government 
minister, David Curry, informed the House of Commons that not one single council 









significant   body   that   promoted   the  mayoral   concept,   the  Commission   for   Local 
Democracy (CLD).  The CLD was described as being independent, but its members 
and   donors   included   trades'   unions   and   Labour  Council   group   leaders.   Jenkins 
became the Commission's second chair while Stoker was one of the contributors to 
13  From 1993 to 2001 I was a constituency agent for the Conservative Party and this 





(Bullock  2002:131).    Under  Simon Jenkins,   the  CLD commissioned a  number  of 
academics to research different aspects of the local government system and its first 
recommendation was unequivocally in favour of the mayoral model:  'Local authorities  
should consist  of  a directly elected   Council  and a directly elected Leader/Mayor'  
(CLD 1995:54, Pratchett and Wilson 1996:250).  Underpinning this recommendation 
was a principle   that   the Executive and  the Assembly  functions of  a   local  council  
should be separated, however, there was no mention of the Executive, called a Mayor 




























the   Labour   Party   at   that   time   (Rallings  et   al  2002:69).    The   internal   political 
management needs of the Labour Party were obfuscated in part by being presented 




loony   Left”,   Blair   and   his   colleagues   stressed   the   need   for   “modernisation” 
(Hambleton and Sweeting 2004:476).    Such an  indirect  approach was necessary 
because by the 1997 general election the Labour Party was the largest party by far in  
UK   local   government   in   terms   of   seats   held   and   councils   controlled,   hence 
undermining   the   argument   that   councillors  were   an  electoral   liability   for   national 
elections  (Rallings   and  Thrasher   1997:128).     Those   councillors  would   also  have 
disputed the “loony Left” label.
14Professor George Jones repeated this assertion at a PSA-Local Government Specialist 
committee Conference, University of Birmingham, 30 January 2009, linking Blair's 




While  executive mayors  were part  of   the  Labour  Party's  1997 manifesto  agenda, 










Between 1997 and 2001,   local  government affairs   remained part  of  one ministry, 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), headed by the 





well serving as a council  leader before becoming an MP17.    Not only was there a 
unified   team  in  charge of   local  government,  but  Prime Minister  Blair   retained his 
recently found desire to reform local government and so mitigate the perceived threat 
to   the   Labour   government   from Labour­run   councils.    As  he   stated   in   his   1998 
pamphlet  Leading the Way:  'If  you are unwilling or unable to work to  the modern  
agenda then the government will have to look to other partners to take on your role'  
(Blair   1998:22).     The   implication   was   that   councils   might   have   responsibilities, 
17  Hodge and Thompson (1994) Beyond the Town Hall – Re-inventing local government 
and Hodge et al (1997) More than the flower show: elected mayors and democracy
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(DETR 1998a,  b,   c,   d,  e  and   f)  of  which  Modernising  Local  Government:  Local  
Democracy and Community Leadership  (DETR 1998b)  commences the debate on 
new  executive  arrangements  by   repeating  some  of   the  goals   of   the  1967  Maud 
Committee stating:












offered (DETR 1998g:4,18, 20­23).   A further White Paper  Local Leadership, Local  
Choice  (DETR   1999:8­11,13­17,   22)   developed   these   concepts   as   a   prelude   to 
legislation. 
From these key documents, three key questions emerge: 

































further  issue  for  the Labour government about  the way  the council  conducted  its 




on   detailed   issues   rather   than   concentrating   on   the   essentials.'  (DETR 
1998b:5)





















Within   the   academic   community   Berg   and   Rao   (2005:42),   Rao   (2006:19)   have 
repeated these views and developed the negative analysis of committees.  The failing 






to  develop a  degree of  expertise  with  which   to  challenge officers'  policy  options 
(Elcock 1976:181,  Stewart  2003:56).    Committees have also been defended as a 
means   to  diffuse  power  within   the   council   (Newman  2001:76).    Furthermore,  by 
having the Full Council meeting as the final and ultimate decision­making body, the 
notion of all councillors being equal was given expression (Elcock 2001:170).  


















agenda,  which   is   the   Labour  Government's   own   phrase:  'The  Government  was 








elections,   particularly   a   recommendation   to   have   all   unitary   and   urban   council  
elections “by thirds”, that is in three member wards with one councillor being elected 





since there was no mention of  the supplementary vote electoral  system that  was 
eventually   introduced   as   the  means   of   choosing   the  winning   executive  mayoral 
candidate.     One   explanation   is   that   this   omission   was   deliberate,   a  means   of 
encouraging the take up of executive mayors without the distraction of a relatively 
new electoral process.  Another possibility that gains credence after the Labour Party 
lost   the   London  Mayoral   election   in  May  2000,   could  be   that   the   nature  of   the 
electoral  system was omitted  in  order  not   to  cause consternation  in  within   those 
Labour­run councils that might consider adopting a directly elected mayor. 
Having   summarised   the  problem  as   being   three  deficits:   the   lack   of   leadership, 
accountability   and   legitimacy,   the   government's   modernisation   process   was   an 
attempt to offer solutions to remove these short­falls.   The desired outcomes were 
expressed   in   three   improvements:   greater   efficiency,   greater   transparency   and 
greater accountability, which form the fourth tier of Figure 1 (p40): 





are   based.     Accountability:   Increased   transparency   will   enable   people   to  
measure the executive's actions against the policies on which it was elected.  
Councillors will no longer have to accept responsibility for decisions in which  
they  took no part.  That  should sharpen  local  political  debate and  increase  
interest in elections to the council' (DETR 1998g:19)
'...efficiency,   where   decisions   can   be   taken   quickly,   responsively   and  
accurately to meet the needs and aspirations of the community; transparency,  







cabinet,  a  directly   elected  mayor  with  an   indirectly  elected  cabinet,  or  a  directly 
elected  mayor  with  an  appointed  council  manager   (s.  11  LGA 2000).    Following 
amendments in Parliament, the legislation did offer a revised form of the committee 
system, called alternative arrangements,  but  this option was restricted to councils 
with   a   population   under   85,000   (s.31   LGA   2000).     Figure   1   (p40)   provides   an 
analytical   framework   to   identify   changes   through  which   to   assess   the   impact   of 
introducing   directly   elected   mayors:   efficiency,   transparency   and   accountability. 
Improvements  in any or all  of   these  three areas would signify a reduction of  the 
deficits   in   leadership,   legitimacy   and   accountability   and   provide   evidence   that 
executive mayors had made a political difference.  
Having  legislated to  introduce a strategic directly elected mayor  for London (GLA 
1999),   the  government   introduced  its  second Local  Government  Bill   in  1999  that 
offered executive directly elected mayors for English and Welsh local authorities.  An 
important background to the Parliamentary debate was the conduct of the London 
mayoral  election  in  May 2000,  which might  have had an  impact  on  the  resulting 
legislation.  The Labour Party experienced problems as a consequence of its London 
mayoral  candidate selection process as  the Party  was divided  into  two elements: 
firstly,   those   who   favoured   the   former   Greater   London   Council   Leader   Ken 





































elected   executive   mayor   and   the   indirectly   elected   cabinet   leader,   which   are 
illustrated   in   Table   3   (p50),  may   be   of   concern.     The   lack   of   clear,   significant 














compared   to   cabinet   leaders  as  a  means   of   encouraging   councils   to   adopt   the 
directly elected mayoral innovation.
Once legislation had been enacted, the first referendum was held in Berwick­upon­
Tweed on  7  June  2001,   the   same  day  as   the  general  election.    By   the  end  of  
December 2002 30 referendums had been held of which 11 chose  the executive 
mayoral   option   (Copus   2006:26­27,  www.nlgn.org.uk).     That   fact   that   the   initial 
referendum did  not  produce a  “yes”  vote might  be perceived as  indicating  future 
problems, although the government did not interpret the result as a warning at that 
time.    It  was noticeable that none of  the major UK cities – Birmingham20,  Leeds, 
20 In 2007 The Birmingham Mail failed to encourage 36,0000 citizens to sign a petition to 
call a mayoral referendum http://www.birminghammail.net/news/birmingham-
campaigns/elected-mayor/2007/11/08/six-months-in-and-the-fight-continues-for-mayor-
petition-97319-  20079553/  
50
Liverpool,  Manchester and Sheffield,  had held referendums or been compelled  to 
hold one.  Yet, from the list of referendums, it was not clear how close England came 
to having more executive mayors had the government used its intervention powers to 











failed   to   follow  through with   the  commissions'   recommendations.     In   the  case of 











government   did   not   use   its   reserve   powers   to   direct   a   referendum.     Liverpool's 












































During   Byers'   tenure   as   the   Secretary   of   State,   perhaps   the   most   significant 
exogenous   event  was   the   11  September   2001   terrorist   attack   on   the  US.     The 
prominence of New York's Mayor Giuliani in the aftermath of the destruction of the 
city's  Twin  Towers  was cited  as   reason  for   the  success of  a  number  of  mayoral 
referendums (Game 2002c:10), however, no evidence has been produced to support 
a   causal   relationship   between   the   attack   and   the   referendum   outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the media coverage of Mayor Giuliani did provide a vivid example of a 





















involved   in   two  of  Prescott's   favoured  projects:   securing  directly  elected   regional 
assemblies, and creating unitary local authorities (Chandler 2007:279) and only one 
successful mayoral referendum occurred during the period 2002 to 2006, in Torbay. 
Politically,   the   Labour   Party's   greatest   mayoral   successes   relating   to   executive 
mayors occurred in 2005 when its candidates defeated the Conservative incumbent 
in North Tyneside and the independent in Stoke­on­Trent, while holding off a strong 








the Conservative candidate Linda Arkley,  making her   the  first  executive mayor   to 
54
have regained a mayoralty after a defeat.  Interestingly Mayor Drummond lost ground 
by not having a strong Labour Party  parliamentary campaign  to mobilise support  
around   him   as   the   leading   independent   candidate.     His   majority   over   another 
independent was much reduced in 2009 compared to what it had been over Labour in 
2005 (see Appendix C).
In  May  2005   there  was  another   reorganisation  of  ministerial   portfolios  with   local 







Communities  (DCLG   2006:10­12,50),   which   proposed   removing   the   mechanism 
requiring   a   referendum   before   an   executive   mayor   was   adopted   and   allowing 
councillors alone to make the decision.  What was significant at the time was that the 
media saw this change as making it easier to introduce executive mayors by making 
it   easier   for   councils   to   recommend   change  (BBC   2006b).    Yet,   a   survey   had 
indicated   that   councillors  were  one  group   that  was  substantially   opposed   to   the 
introduction   of   mayors   (Rao   and   Young   1999:59).     Opposition   to   change   was 
confirmed as no council chose the executive mayoral option when their constitutions 




















journalist)   to   try   to   trigger   a   referendum  for   constitutional   change.    The  English 
Democrat victor of June 2009's mayoral election in Doncaster was also committed to 
abolishing the office.  


















do   is   you  need   to  have  a   council   resolution   to   have  a   referendum about  
whether you move away.' (interview data)
Tony Brown, Hartlepool's senior lawyer was equally unequivocal on this:
'I   think   it's   taken some by surprise  I  must  say  at  one point   it   took  me by  
surprise,   that   the   local   population,   once   you've   got   an   elected   the   local  
population cannot by petition call for a referendum to drop the elected mayor.'  
(interview data)









manifesto   commitment   to   abolish   the   executive   mayoral   form   of   government 
(Doncaster Free Press 11 June 200928).  
A different  pattern was observed  in  Stoke­on­Trent,   the only  council   to adopt   the 
27  While LGA 2000 provided extensive provision for the holding of referendums to move 
to an executive mayor, only a vote by the council can initiate a referendum to remove 






that  might   be   be   closer   to   the   executive  mayoral  model   practised   elsewhere   in 
England   (Stoke­on­Trent  Council   12­12­2006)29.    Events  overtook   this  because   in 
October 2008 the authority held a referendum that resulted in the abolition of the 
executive mayoralty when the last elected mayor's term of office ended in June 2009 




The executive mayoral  concept enjoyed a brief   renaissance  in 2007  first  with  the 
Conservative  Party's  Cities  Taskforce   recommending   this  model   both   for   top   tier 
authorities  and   for  new Pan­City  authorities   (Heseltine  2007:1).    Given  that  Lord 
Heseltine chaired the task force and produced its report,  its support for executive 
mayors might have been expected.  The Conservative Party leader, David Cameron 
was  reported  in   the media as endorsing Lord Heseltine's   report   the day after   its 
publication (Pierce 2007)31, however, there appeared to be no subsequent follow­up 
by way of Conservative­run  local authorities seeking  to adopt  the mayoral model. 
Nevertheless,  Cameron   asserted   his   view   at   the   Local  Government   Association 
Conference  in  July  2008  that executive mayors might  be suitable for   large cities, 
although this would not be imposed.  
In the Conservative Party's 2009 “Green Paper” the commitment to executive mayors 
29  http://www.stoke.gov.uk/ccm/content/cc/news_releases/mldecember-2006/410_06.en 
accessed 15-07-2007





large   cities   with   the   opportunity   to   choose   whether   to   have   an   elected  mayor' 
(Conservative   Party   2009:21).     There   was   less   clarity   in   the   Liberal   Democrat 







executive  mayors,   firstly,   by   considering   changes   to  make   it   easier   to   call   for   a 
referendum:





to   vote   as  most   referendums   have   returned   a   “no”   vote.     A   full   list   of   all   the 





would   chair   the   Local   Strategic   Partnership   and,   be   the   new  Crime   and  
Policing   representative,   as   announced   by   the   Prime  Minister   in   the   draft  
legislative programme for 2008­09'. (DCLG 2008:94)
No evidence was produced about why these very limited additional roles would be so 







indicates  the uneven  journey  to arrival  of  directly  elected mayors  in English  local 




the time  line confirms that the concept has become rooted  in  the thoughts of the 
national   political  elite,   even   if   it   presently   lacks  a   sponsor   in   government   office. 








British public policy,  the  thesis will   return  to  the core themes: visible accountable 
leadership and democratic accountability identified in Figure 1 (p40) and in the next 















indicates   that   it  was  a  key  concept   in  understanding  public   policy   towards   local 
government and hence a vital dimension along which to measure political change. 
For example, the 1998 Green Paper stated: 'Executive leadership needs to be visible.  
An  individual can provide a clear  focus for  local  leadership as experience across  
Europe and the Western world shows.'  (DETR 1998b:30).   In the subsequent White 
Paper a modern, twenty first century council was described as one that has  '...clear  








the   introduction   of   a   separate   executive,   including   directly   elected  mayors   (Blair 
1998:16,  DETR 1998g:20).    The  theme of   leadership  was continued  In   the  1999 
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White   Paper   where  the   government   asserted   that   there   was   a   need   for   local 
authorities   to   have  'a   clearly   identified   executive   to   give   strong   leadership   to  
communities, and clarity to decision taking'  (DETR 1999:130).   Such leadership, it 
was suggested, could be delivered by:   'a directly elected mayor with a cabinet; a  
cabinet  with  a   leader;  and a  directly  elected mayor  and council  manager  (DETR 
1998g:21­23).   The details of these options are summarised as Figures 2, 3 and 4, 
(pp  47,  48  and  49).     In   fact,   the  titles of   two white  papers  themselves    –  Local  
Leadership,  Local  Choice  (DETR 1999),  Strong  Local  Leadership,  Quality  Public  
Services  (DTLR 2001b) – provide  further  evidence  that  changes  in   the nature of 




mayors have made.   First,  a normative model,  derived from government  thinking, 
describing what local political leadership ought to be is established.  In the chapter's 
first section some problems of definition, especially the terms local and leadership, 
will  be examined.   The nature of what  is local is significant  in the English context  















have  been  advanced,   particularly   the  descriptive  ones,   to   aid   in   the  analysis   of 
executive mayors as leaders  in an English context.    From this  literature, the third 
section will develop an understanding of the term “political”, which will relate to the 
task of resolving disputes about the allocation of public resources and determination 
of  public  policy,  an  activity  with  which  executive  mayors  are  connected  as   local 
leaders.  From this literature, some conceptual models will be introduced that will be 
employed both as means of longitudinal analysis within individual mayoral authorities 










White  Papers  about   the   roles  a new  local  government  executive  may undertake. 








● represent   the  authority   and   its   community's   interests   to   the  outside  
world; 
● build   coalitions   and   work   in   partnership   with   all   sectors   of   the  




























Counting   the   references   in   the   two   White   Papers   indicates   that   they   are 
overwhelmingly focused on these internal processes with 8 out of the 14 bullet points 
being wholly or largely linked to work within the town hall, not the wider community. 












government's   faults   that   the   reforms were meant   to  address.    First,   there was a 
concern about low turnout in local elections, with fewer than two in five voters going 
















behind closed doors, with   little open,  democratic  scrutiny and where many  
councillors feel unable to influence events.' (DETR 1998g:11)







back   to   himself   a  particular   decision  which  might   otherwise   be   taken   by  







the   1998   Green   Paper   stated,   a   duty   to   consult   would   be   introduced   (DETR 




closely   to  some perceived but  undefined general  will.    Therefore,  Figure 6  (p68) 
develops an understanding of what central government thought the new, strong, local 
































while   “official”   will   be   reserved   for   an   appointed   local   government   officer   –   an 
employee,   not  a   politician.    Such  a  distinction   is   important   since   this   thesis  will 
consider issues of the desirability of mayors to appoint personal staff or even non­ 
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councillors   to   cabinet   positions.     It   also   relates   to   issues   of   transparency   and 
accountability that will be explored in subsequent chapters.
There is also a challenge in that there is no common definition of the term “local”.  It 
might  mean   the   geographical   boundaries   of   a   local   authority   as  well   as   small 






charters,   legislation   and   geographical   borders   has   some   relevance   for   other 
countries,   such  as   the  US,  where   local  government   borders  may   change  slowly 
(Caufield and Larsen 2002:18).  In considering British local government the historical,  






back   to   reorganisation   in   '74  when   I  was   a   local   government   officer.  We  
combined, on local government reorganisation we got Warsop Urban District  
Council,  Mansfield Woodhouse Urban District Council  and former Mansfield  
Borough Council.' (interview data)
Some of the other mayoral authorities possess deeper historical roots, for example, 
















political   leadership   should   conform   to   the   scientific   requirements   of   providing 
simplicity as well as parsimony.  
There appears to be a divergence between the approach taken by those who study 
local  politics  who   focus  on  behavioural   aspects  of   leadership,  and   those  whose 
leadership theories are derived from business or administration.  Grint (2000:2) and 
Morrell and Hartley (2006a:491­493) summarise four types of leadership theory: trait,  















As   a   consequence   of   these   shortcomings,  Morrell   and  Hartley   (2006a:491­493) 
adopted the concept of  constitutive leadership, which centred on the exchanges of 
information   and   the   creation   of   favoured   groups  who   receive  more   access   and 
information as opposed to excluded groups or people.   There is some evidence of 
this   in   English   local   government   case   studies,   for   example   Newton   (1976:70), 
Saunders   (1979:232)   and   particularly   by  Dearlove   (1971:147,   1973:159­162),  who 
noted  the presence of   “insider”  and  “outsider”  groups  in  and around  the  council. 
Dearlove termed the former “helpful” (1973:159) and “proper” (op. cit.162) since the 
groups   espoused   policies   favourable   to   the   administration,   presented   them  in   a 
constructive way or were seen as helpful towards councillors.   Equally, the outsider 








deduce concise definitions of  political   leadership.    Dahl   (1961:95­97) was able  to 
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derive only a  limited framework  from his study of directly elected mayors  in New 
Haven, noting  that  leaders seek to  influence those who can provide resources  to 
deliver   their   visions.     Elcock   (1995:548,   2001:17)   and   Fenwick  et   al  (2003:38) 








definition   that  begs questions  about  what  a  position  of  authority   is  and  who  the 
competitors   are?     In   the   context   of   English   executive   mayors   this   notion   of 
competitors is useful when observing the interaction of mayors and chief executives 
or other political figures, for example cabinet members or the leaders of political party  
groups.    Yet,   these definitions have not established  themselves as dominant  and 
other approaches must be considered.
A   core   conceptualisation   of   the   role   of   leaders   stresses   their   role   as  agents  of 
change, as Burns (1978:454) observed:
'True   leadership   is   not  merely   symbolic   or   ceremonial...The   result   of   the  
interactive process is a change in leaders' and followers' motives and goals  
that produces a causal effect on social relations and political institutions.'
A   bias   towards   producing   change   is   shared   by  Rao   (2003:8)   and   Leach  et   al 
(2005:72),  however,   this   is  a  normative  value,  which  may  not  correspond   to   the 
wishes of the electors and overlooks the possibility that stability is also a legitimate 
goal (Bowers and Rich 200:217).   Hence,  Svara (2002b:44) offered:  'government in  
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collaborative and focused on accomplishment of common goals', a definition which 
allows   for   the   avoidance   of   change   as   a   leadership   goal,   providing   it   is   the 
consequence of  a  deliberate policy choice and not  merely  a  result  of   inaction or 
indecision.





























more   readily   adapted   to   the   study   of   executive  mayors   than   the   list   offered   by 
Kellerman (op. cit.)  above.   Nevertheless, a number of questions flow from these 
criteria, especially regarding elections and the electorate.   First, what constitutes a 
democratic   election?    One   attribute   is   that  most   adults   should   be   able   to   vote 
(Rawlings 1988:1), but this is compromised if electoral registration procedures fail to 
register certain groups,  for example young people or ethnic minority communities. 














33  In the UK an American citizen, for example, may not be registered to vote at local 
elections, even if that person pays all local and national taxes whereas an EU citizen 
will, even if they are not tax payers.
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If the goal is to achieve representation, qua socio­demographic resemblance of the 
local   electorate,   this   clearly   cannot   be   achieved   in   a   single   elected   post.     The 
distinctiveness of representatives was stressed by Eulau (1978:51) who argued that 
seeking such statistical  matching  is misleading since by the act of being elected, 








excluding   the   non­elected   component   from   leadership   could   risk   omitting   a   key 
person  from the analysis.    The above  indicates the significance of understanding 
representation   in   order   to   better   comprehend   what   a   local   political   leader   is. 
Therefore,   there will  be a more  thorough discussion of   representation  theories  in 
chapter four.
The scope of the above lists is problematic when adapting them into an analytical 
tool,   therefore some of  the other  core works relating  to  leadership as defined by 















































































and   these  could  embrace  working  with  stakeholders,  partners  and  other   tiers  of 




































choices,   leading opinion rather  than slavishly   following  it.'     No suggestions were 









the   ruler.    Elcock's   focus  on   the   retention  of  office   (Elcock   ibid),  allows  political 
leaders   to   be   conceptualised   as   utility  maximisers   and   their   activities  would   be 
amenable   to  analysis   through   rational  choice  methods.    Linking   the  concepts  of 














































































attributes   for   a   political   leader.     Kotter   and   Lawrence's   (1974)   study   of   20  US 
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mayoralties has been employed as a key reference point since  it   is  held  to be a 











confused  with   the  civic  or  ceremonial   indirectly  elected  mayors  present   in   some 
English  local  authorities.    Madgwick's  (1978:68)  “garrulous”  category  in which the 










located here  in  this category since a mayor or  leader who was wholly under  the  
control of an external organisation or persons who dictated policy would be similarly 
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interpreted   as   an   adaptation   of  Weber's   (1967:358­362)   classic   concept   of   the 
charismatic leader into being part of an elected formal structure.  Moreover, there is 




personal   leadership  qualities   rather   than  party   rules  or   formal  posts   to  dominate 
colleagues  (Elcock 1981:439­441),  although  this  character  might  also  derive   their 
power from better knowledge or exploitation of Party rules.
The “executive” column contains those definitions that describe a strong hierarchical  
form  of   control   hence   attributes   linked   to   a   leader   in   this   context   include  being 
business­like in delivering business with a strong emphasis on continuity and stability 
(Madgwick   1978:68)   or   being  a   goal   setter   (Svara  1987:209).     Svara's   (op.   cit.) 












political   leadership (DETR 1998:18,  DETR 1999:13).    Such a conceptualisation of 
leadership is supported both by Burns' description of the “transformational  leader” 





As   well   as   these   conceptualisations,   another   significant   approach   has   been 
Mouritzen   and  Svara's   (2002:67­68)   comparative   study   of  western   local   political 
leadership, which developed the above classifications into a two­dimensional model. 
The   first   axis   uses   summary   labels,   some   of   which   are   familiar:   “caretaker”, 
“innovator”,   “broker”  and “reformer” while  the second axis addresses how leaders 













Lawrence’s  (1974:105) original   ideas.    Svara’s model   (1990:118)  is   reproduced as 
Figure 7 (p84), however, by putting the innovator in a cell that scores highly for both 










mayor   to  a   lackey;   third,   the  economic  elite  who  could   turn   the  mayor   into   their 
delegate and fourth an entrepreneur who might be free from any such controls.  The 






















By   stressing   that   leadership   is   about   the   leader's   actions,   Leach   and  Wilson 
(2000:11­13) are refuting the notion that socio­economic or other exogenous forces 
determine leaders’ conduct and the outputs of local government, and this appears to 
favour  concepts of agent over structure.     In   this context,   the  leader,  or executive 
mayor, is an agent with a sufficient freedom of action to impose his or her will on local  





local  political   leadership provides a  legitimacy and accountability   that  others may 
lack.  
While the literature review has noted the absence of a prevalent theory, however, it 




one other dimension that needs to be examined and,  if  appropriate,  incorporated, 
namely, the notion of political in 'local political leadership'.   Such a definition is vital 




phenomenon being  investigated  is  that of   the degree of political  change  that has 
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intuitive,   however,   there   is   a   lack   of   clear   understanding   by   some   participants 
themselves   as   to   what   the   term  means.    Mayor   Egginton   repudiated   a   narrow 













as  a  Labour  mayor   you  would  expect   to   see  me putting   into  practice  my  





it   was   always   assumed   that   the   local   electorate   would   appoint   or   elect  
someone   from   a   political   party.  And   that's   less   and   less   the   case   these  
days...so  I   think  the  term  isn't  quite   right   these days because  it  should be  








to   direct   local   councils,   especially   since   the   1980s   (Loughlin   1996a:88). 
Nevertheless, Aristotle's definition does embody  the notion of a political   figure as 
someone who serves a greater cause than their own. 
A  more  practical  approach   to   defining  modern  politics  was  undertaken  by  Crick 
(1982:21) who emphasised the role of politics as being able to give a proportionate 





that   avoids  excessive  civil   strife  may   involve   the  policy  maker  pursuing  different 
courses of actions to those their citizens desired, which brings into question their role 

















Therefore,   the   thesis  will   proceed  with  Stoker's   definition:  'Politics,   especially   in  
democratic societies, enables people to compromise and reach an agreement.  It is a  
means to orderly and legitimate self­rule.' (Stoker 2006:7).  Being able to compromise 
also   has   implications   for   executive  mayors   as   representatives   able   to   adapt   to 

















and   a   representative.     Since   executive  mayoral   posts   are   occupied   by   full­time 
politicians rather than traditional councillors who would have met Berg and Rao's (op.  
cit.)   definition   of   the   “layman”   politician,   a   model   that   accounts   for   this 
professionalisation is needed.   Leach and Wilson (2000:9) offer an alternative that 
illustrates how a leader's   personal agenda and political skills and the political and 


















system and  other  exogenous  elements  act  on  each of   these circles   to   influence 












will   employ   the   three  categories  defined  by  Elcock   (2001:105)  namely  governing 
(internal   operations),   governance,   and   survival   in   office  as  well   as   the   the   four 

















The next   task   is   to  operationalise   these concepts   to  allow  for  measurement  and 
comparison.   First, the power and decision­making relationships within the mayoral 





Wilson's  (1887:210)  findings  in   the  late Nineteenth Century.   Svara (1990:op. cit.) 
identified this space as containing mission, policy, administration and management, 
which represents a zero­sum contest between the elected member and the appointed 































change as  well  as  being used as   the basis   for  comparison between  the various 
English mayoral councils.   Figure 11 (p95) demonstrates the final model, as revised 




be  to  construct  a   flowchart   to map the public  decision­taking process  in mayoral 
cabinets and to infer from that, with reference to the literature, what decision­making 








producing   a   difference   in   the   politics   of   local   government   decision­making.     In 
particular, evidence will be sought of individual or collective decision­making as this 
will   reflect the degree to which executive mayors are acting as executive  leaders. 
The flow charts are developed in chapter seven.
Given the emphasis placed on political context in defining political leadership (Leach 
et  al  2005:3)   the  electoral  history   for  each  mayoral  authority  will  be   reviewed  in 
Chapter Five to note any any changes in political party's representation on mayoral  
authorities   since   the   change  of   executive  arrangements.    By   doing   this   a  more 














the  government's  own expectations and,  based on  the  data,  plotting how closely 




form   of   executive   structure.     The   summary   dimension   is   conceptualised   as   a 












of   politics   as  an   extension   of   self­government,  which   is   itself   a   development   of 
Smith's   concept   of   local­self   government   (Smith   2003[1851]:7).     Therefore,   it   is 
appropriate in the next chapter to consider theories of representation, since these 








At   first,   the  need   to   study   representation  may  appear   counter­intuitive  as  Prime 
Minister Blair (1998:16) had stated: 'In short, we need to separate the executive from  
the representative role.'   Such an assertion  implies that  leadership theories alone 
would   provide   an   adequate   framework   for   the   question:  what  were   the   political 

























for   the   local   political   leader   to  be   the   council's   spokesperson   (DETR 1998g:25). 
There is a second possibility, which implies that the leader is taking on the role of the 
local ombudsman whose duty it is to be the people's advocate to the council, that is 
also a representational  function.   The  Strong and Prosperous Communities  White 
Paper   (DCLG   2006:49)   classified   representation   with   leadership   as   governance 
activities  that  were being undermined by  the framework  in which  local  authorities 
operate.  It stated: 'Local government derives both its representative mandate and its  
leadership legitimacy from its democratic mandate'  (DCLG 2006:61).   The changing 




Since  the  local  political   leader  is meant  to be a strong, powerful  actor producing 









































section   will   also   consider   how   the   concept   of   who   ought   to   be   elected   as   a 
representative has adapted over time from being the “better” candidate to the most 
preferred one.  




In   the   third  section   the  more abstract,  philosophical  definitions  of   the  concept  of 
representation as opposed  to  its direct   relationship  to governing will  be explored. 
Here, special emphasis will be placed on Pitkin's (1967) work and her attempts to 
disaggregate the concepts of representation and liberal democratic elections.   It  is 











The   role   of   Ancient   Greek   cities   in   theories   of   representation   may   appear 
contradictory since for some cites, especially Athens, there was a direct democracy in 







attrib. 2002:89­100).   As Aristotle (1981:187) stated,  '...the citizen body of a state is  
sovereign, the citizen­body is the constitution' . 
Selection alone was not sufficient to enable a person to take office as all officials had 





associated  with   the   existence   of   a   public   space   in   which   all   citizens   could   be 
accommodated   to   facilitate   debate   and   deliberation   without   the   need   for 





society since, having removed duties,   '...there's no compulsion either  to exercise  
authority if you are capable of it, or to submit to authority if you don't want to;' (Plato 















about   his   fellow   citizens:  '...you   took  my   advice  when   you   were   untouched   by  
misfortune, and repented of your action when things went badly with you' (Thucydides 
1954:159).   Athenian democracy was also beset by the problem of free riding, of a 

























thesis  is that a person who wished to be a political  leader was denied that office  
because he failed to secure a mandate from those whom he wished to govern.  The 























'In   the   first   [book]   of   the  Metaphysics   Aristotle  posits   the   opinion   of   the  
multitude and the testimony of the many as a cause of our errors ... Nothing  




34There is some research from Canada in the 1990s that tends to confirm that Roman 
Catholics are less committed to representative democracy than Protestants (Nadeau 






of   people   would   help   to   improve   the   quality   of   legislation.     There   is   also   an 
acknowledgement   that   the   lack   of   good   candidates   can   undermine   elections 









accountability   (Pitkin   1967:   241).     For   example,   the   Dominican  Order   of   which 
Aquinas   was   a  member,   developed   a   constitution   in   which   the   head   of   each 
monastery was both elected by his fellow monks and was accountable to them.  He 
could be relieved of his duties – “absolved” – if those he served felt he had not acted 
in   the  best   interests   of   the  order   (Galbraith   1925:113).    Requiring  a   ruler   to   be 













the   Middle   Ages   that   a   majoritarian   system   is   developed   using   numbers   as 










The problems of restraining power  that were present  in Medieval political   thought 




from the  invasion of Forrainers (sic),  and  the  injuries of  one another...is   to  
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of  
men...' (Hobbes 1981[1651]:227, Held 1987:49).
35  Non zeli ad zelum, nec meriti ad meritum, sed solum numeri ad numerum  fiat  
collatio' (Colomer and McLean 1998:11).
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For Locke, however,   the goal was a society  that protected  the  individuals'  private 
interests as his normative model of society was in which men were in: 
'...a   state  of   perfect  Freedom  to  order   their  Actions,   and  dispose  of   their  
Possessions, and Person as they think fit...without asking leave or depending  
upon the Will of any other Man.' Locke (1963[1690]:374).




John   Stuart   Mill,   broadened   the   debate   by   developing   an   enduring   notion   of 
representation from his 1774 address to electors in the City of Bristol, in which he saw 
the role of Member of Parliament as serving the whole nation by declaring:























(Madison  et al:ibid).    What  is of  particular note  is how the constitution combined 




approach,  which  emphasised   the   town  meeting  and   the  participation  of  all   local 
citizens  in  the decisions that effect  them (Wolman 1995:136).   Such an approach 




even   when   granted   the   vote,   citizens   could   not   abnegate   their   interest   in   how 











amongst  members   of   the   same   socio­economic   class,   an   interest   that   is   often 
rendered   into   a   dichotomy  of  workers  and   capitalists.    Once   the   revolution   has 
occurred and capital defeated, however, it would appear that the replacement system 
would   be   free   from   representation   as   the   ruling   class   would   be   the   workers 
themselves (Held 1987:120).  What is central to the Marxist concept is the dominance 









et   al  1989:44,   DETR   1998g:28,   ODPM   2005:22,   DCLG   2006:50).     In   its   local 
government White Papers, a high emphasis was placed on the microcosmic aspects 
of representation: 
'The Government's  consultation  paper  on   local  democracy  and  community  
leadership quoted recent research which makes clear that the current body of  
councillors   is   not   representative   of   the   population   as   a   whole.'  (DETR 
1998g:28). 







were   not   chosen.    Within   the   natural   and   social   sciences,   random   selection   is 
essential for providing representative samples for statistical analysis (Hinton 1995:4), 







quarter   are   women,   only   half   are   employed   or   self­employed   and   ethnic  
minorities are seriously under­ represented.' (DETR 1998g:10)
Nevertheless some studies have found more diversity amongst local councillors than 
Members of Parliament (Wahlberg  et al  1994:28).    The  justification for an elected 
body  to  be  more   like   the  electorate   itself   is   that   it  may confer   legitimacy on  the 
institution since being able to participate in an institution was urged by Aristotle as a 







want   and   apply   utility   maximisation   to   decide   who   should   represent   them.     A 
complication within English  local  government and a challenge for determining  the 







be   expended   on   organisational   change   rather   than   on   government   (Beetham 
1996:45).    There  are  further  problems  in   that  some groups may eschew political 
participation and representation as was the case with some feminist groups in the 













keen   to  separate   the  notion  of  executive  posts  on   local  councils,  whose  duty   is 
leadership, from the non­executive councillors who are there to represent the local 
communities (DETR 1998g:18, Larsen 2005:202, Rao 2005: 2006:21).    There are 
also   questions   about   what   would   constitute   “resemblance”?     For   example,   one 






Labour   Parties   (Saunders   1979:211)   or   the   Progressive   and   Labour   parties   in 
Glasgow (Brand 1973:473­486).   Hence the Town Hall's Members Room has been 
described as  'the best club in town'  (Elcock 1976:181, Chandler 2007:229).   Similar 





Understanding  representation  has also  been hindered by   the   lack  of  a  dominant 
theory   of   local   government   or   a   common   understanding   of   its   role   (Beetham 
1996:28).    Hill   (1974:18) noted  that   local  government was defined primarily  in  the 
context   of   democratic   rather   than   representation   factors   with   the   role   of   local 
government being to act as a form of counterbalance to central government.   The 
history   of   English   local   government,   however,  might   stress   this   role   was  more 
aspirational   and   abstract   than   achieved   in   practice   owing   to   the   legislative   and 
financial  power of central  government and  the  lack of constitutional  protection  for 
local councils.
One of the underlying tensions in any debate on representation and government is 
whether   the   two can coexist,  or   if   the  presence of  one serves  to  undermine  the 
operation   of   the   other.    Where   representation   is   operationalised   through   liberal 
democratic means, Held (1987:29) and Judge (1999:201) have noted that an excess 










and   so  diminish   the   significance   of   representation.     In   the   1980s   some  Labour 
councils adopted a modified approach  in which council   tenants were seen as the 
prime focus for all council activity (Seabrook 1984:2).   There have been a range of 
advocates   for   local  government  as  a  means whereby  local  people   run   their  own 
affairs   and   act   as   a   counterbalance   to   the   overwhelming   power   of   central 
government, for example Blunkett and Jackson (1987:5,201), Mill (1991 [1867]:241), 
Smith  (2005[1851]:7)  and  the Adam Smith  Institute  (1989:9).    Stewart  and Game 
(1991:4­5)  also  assert   the  need   for   local  government   to   find  a  balance  between 
representation   as   resembling   the   population   and   representation   as   a  means   of 
effective government.
Although representative democratic forms have been investigated, it is worth noting 
that   there   are   alternative   democratic   models   based   on   participation   and 
decentralisation (Burns et al 1994:37).  Cole's concepts of guild based representation 
in which citizens are grouped according to their trade or profession were developed 
by   Pateman   (1970:22­44)   to   provide   for   a   system   of   representation   based   on 
industrial   democracy.    The validity  of   these  concepts  are  questionable  given   the 
changes   in   the   UK   economy   and   the   decline   of  many   large   scale   employers, 









with   Dahl's   (1961)   study   of   New   Haven   and   Newton's   (1976)   investigation   of 
Birmingham City Council.    In a pluralist society there are many competing groups 





pluralism also  involves a conventional one person, one vote  liberal  representative 
democracy,  whereas   the   socialist­guild   alternative   envisaged   a   system   of   group 




a   small   group   of   people  who  may,   consciously   or   unconsciously,   be   acting   as 
representatives   for   interests,   groups,   communities   or   even   a   locality.     For  Mills 
(1956:3­8) the core elements for domination by a small group of leaders, whom he 
termed the  elite, was a stratified society  in which there were economic as well as 
social   leaders.    Furthermore,  Mills   (op cit.)  also asserted  that   this  elite  exercised 
power  by controlling   the  agenda,  by determining  those  issues  that  were deemed 
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suitable for debate and resolution as well in ensuring that other issues were never 
resolved.     A   less   conspiratorial   conceptualisation   describes   an   alliance,   or   a 
collaboration   between   leading   political   and   economic  elites  to   form   a   governing 
regime   (Stone  1989:234­242,  Stoker   1995:56).    According   to  Stone   (1989:184­5) 
business interests and the resources they command are more significant than votes, 
an   observation   that   would   tend   to   support   Dunleavy's   (1980:135)   negative 
assessment of the role of elections as tools to shape policy. 
There are some significant elements of the US economy, from which regime theory 
was derived,  that  may  inhibit   its application  in England.   First,  Birch (1967:38­39) 
noted   the   impact   on   local   government   when   previously   locally   owned   and   run 
businesses became part of larger corporations without personal ties to the council  
area.    Directors   of   these   firms,  who  had  previously   also  been   councillors,  were 
replaced by salaried professional managers who had no long term commitment to the 
locality.    Stone's   (1989:201)  study  is  different   in   that  his  case study city,  Atlanta, 
contains  the headquarters of  an  international  corporation and hence  its  staff  and 
owners had a much greater commitment to that city.  Second, the lack of tax raising 
and land use planning powers for English executive mayors as opposed to some of 
their  American   counterparts  means   that   regime  theory  may  be   less  useful  as  a 
means of explaining or predicting their actions.   In the Local Government Act 2000 
the   government   chose   not   to   allocate   the   power   to   approve   or   reject   planning 
permissions to the executive mayor and this function is retained in a committee of 
non­executive councillors.  Hence any undertakings a mayor may give to a potential 




'I've   been   excluded   from   the   Torbay   Development   Agency,   which   is   the  
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council's vehicle for regeneration.   So the council funds it, I have to propose  













political   parties'   presence   outside   the   council   has   been   in   decline   with   falling 
membership   and   votes   at   local   elections,   their   power   and   control   over   local 
government has been increasing (Game and Leach 1996:148).   Copus (2004b:273) 
has argued that local government representation can now only be conceived as a 
political  party­based  concept.     In   studies  of  national   legislatures,   the   role  of   the 
political party was traditionally conceived as acting as a bridge between the electors 
and the government (Mair and Katz 1997:100) whereas it may be more relevant to 








“going   native”   ­   being   advocates   for   the   council   and   not   for   the   people   ­  with 
consequences for citizen engagement with  the  institution.   How executive mayors 
themselves perceive this challenge will be examined in chapters eight and nine.
Political parties might also be impacting on the concept of representation because of 
the size of   the electorate  in  which executive mayoral  candidates must  campaign. 
Since  the  Nineteenth Century  it  has been  feared  that   large constituencies  would 







opportunities   for   informal   interactions   between   electors   and   their   representatives 
(Kiss 2002:140).     Indeed, Madison (1987[1787]:127) had been concerned that any 
constituency should have sufficiently few electors so that the representative might be 
able to build a personal knowledge of them.




this   is   that   an   executive   mayor   of   a   small,   district   council   would   be   more 
representative than the equivalent mayor of a large urban unitary authority.  Stewart  
and  Game   (1991:37)   and  Rao   (1994:105)   emphasised   the   greater  work   load   in 
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democracies  it   is  difficult   to separate  the notions of   representation and elections. 
Elections confer legitimacy (Dahl 1961:248) and according to the Labour Government 






the   direct   election   of   an   executive  mayor   is   significant   because   of   the   specific 
mandate it grants the victor.   Other definitions stress the need to balance acting on 
behalf   of   others   with   this   authority   being   balanced   by   electoral   accountability 
(Beetham  1996:31­32).     Nevertheless,   it   has   been   argued   that   once   elected,   a 
representative   must   serve   all   the   constituents   and   not   just   their   supporters 





that   the way  local  government operates, particularly  its complexity  and  its arcane 
















whether   any  policy   outcomes  changed   in   relation   to   those  promises.    Saunders 
(1979:218) found in his case study that the officer management team was the main 
policy   initiating   body,   a   view   echoed   by   Dunleavy   (1980:135).    Moreover,   Lord 




account  as  part  of   the  decision  making process  (Leigh  2000:197,  Watt  2006:79). 
Phillips   (1996:21)   offered   the   countering  opinion   that   a   binding  manifesto  would 
obviate the need for consultation or microcosmic representation since electors would 
know what was to be done on their behalf.   A significant limitation of this is what a  



















elected   executive  mayors   as   they   are   closely   identified  with   a   specific   location. 
Ostrogorski (1902:6­11) noted this phenomenon as part of the traditional pattern of 





representation.     Third,   there   was   the   “Radical”   version,   which   involves   the 
representation of the people in the constituency.  A more philosophical approach was 
adopted by Pitkin (1967:144) who suggests that  'Representation means the making  
















or she makes commitments.    If  representation is  interpreted as an agent­principal 
relationship one of the challenges is that the people may not have a clear idea of 
what they want (Pitkin 1967:145).  There might also be a range of areas, where the 
citizens  may   have   no   opinion   (Pitkin   1967:163)   but  where   the   local   authority   is 
compelled to act (Watt  2006:11).   As Hill   (1974:154) noted,  local councils have to 
tackle   specific   problems  whereas   the  elector   has   the   freedom  to  deal   only  with 









and experiences  to   the   representative  body.    Clearly  such a conceptualisation  of 
representation,  while   beneficial   for   assemblies   such  as   the   council,   is   extremely 
problematic  when  electing  a  single  post,   such  as  an  executive  mayor   since   the 
darstellen  any one person can provide will be less than that of the whole body of 






For   the second element  Pitkin   (1967:59)  offered  vertreten:  “to  act   for  another”,  a 
concept that relates more to leadership since it encompasses how the representative 
may perform actions that will benefit those they represent.   For Pitkin the notion of 
vertreten  serves   to   expand   the   debate   about   representation   beyond   that   of 
accountability   or   resemblance   (Pitkin   1967:113)   and   also   to   offer   an   interesting 















that   this   is  more significant   for   local  authorities  that  can be subject   to  wholesale 
reorganisation or amendment at the legislative will of central government36.   As well 
as the impermanence of boundaries, the development of governance also presents a 
36  Bedford itself was altered in 2009 becoming a unitary authority with new elections to 
the council, but not for executive mayor, following a reorganisation of the local 
authorities in Bedfordshire (SI 2008/907)
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wishes  into  policy   (DETR 1998g:25),   the   introduction  of  executive  mayors  was a 




and  the  politico  –  who  incorporates  elements  of   the   two other   roles.    Glassberg 
(1981:10)   augmented   this  by  adding   the  holistic,  whose   focus  encompasses   the 
whole  local  authority,  and  the  particularist  who puts his  or  her  ward  first.    Judge 
(1999:60) has argued that for councillors the trustee role is less prevalent but it tends 
to be revived by a councillor when he or she is in conflict with their local party.  While  






























stresses  that   leadership   is  a   form of  action which  involves persuading people  to 
undertake actions that they would not otherwise do (Elcock 2001:85).  Leadership is 
also   about   articulating   a   vision   for   the   locality   (Mouritzen   and   Svara   2002:67). 
Moreover,   it   is  quite  possible   to  study  leadership  with   reference  to   followers,  but 
without invoking any theory of representation (Burns 2003:170­185).  Instead, the role 
of leader tends to be associated with bringing change, or with developing a vision 





scrutiny   and   the   titles   of   the   White   Papers   sent   a   strong   message   of   the 
Government's intent: Local Leadership, Local Choice (DETR 1999) and Strong Local  
Leadership, Quality Public Services  (DTLR 2001b).   Leach and Wingfield (2000:48) 
argue that  the  Modern Local Government  White Paper (DETR 1998g)  focuses on 




intention   of   the   legislation   as   I   understood   it,   to   provide   a   high   level   of  
accountability,   so   the   people   would   know   who   was   actually   making   the  
decisions.' (interview data)




and   Eulau  et   al  (1978:118­119).     Here   the   combination   of  trustee,  politico  and 
delegate will be used as it offers the most relevant framework for examining single 
elected  posts  whereas  Corina,   in  particular,   is  more  appropriate   for  a   traditional 
council.  The three classifications should be capable of being operationalised in that  
different policy choices and actions would be expected of executive mayors according 




to promote the place or the borough first  and foremost.    The politico  is  the most 














elected,  and  given   the  significant   role  played  by  political  parties   in  English   local 
government, especially at election, time, it is beneficial to augment that model to take 




latter   term   appears   to   be   council­centric   and   introspective,   and   given   that   the 
government's  overall  desire  included  individual  decision­making (DETR 1998g:19), 





March 200938),  which  in one sense deprives  them of  that act,  but also serves  to 
37  On 12 March 2009 Mayor Winter in Doncaster, having been de-selected as the Labour 
candidate a year earlier, announced his decision not to seek re-election following a 




























































each   aspect   to   provide   either   a   unique   solution   to   each   application   (King  et   al 
1994:121) or the different possible conjunctural combinations (Ragin 1987:20,26,47). 
Since a predominantly qualitative methodology  is employed  in  the thesis,  Table 7 












Since  executive  mayors  are   representatives  as  well  as   leaders,  and  since  being 
directly elected is one phenomenon that makes English executive mayors distinctive, 














English  local government.    Furthermore, supplementary vote was a relatively new 
electoral system in England having only been used once before, in May 2000 to elect 
the Mayor of London.


















One   reason  why  executive  mayors  are  able   to   exert   such  a  moral   and  political 






powerful,   I  mean no council   leader has that respect.     It   is hugely different,  
which is not to say that some council leaders don't act like they do, but that's  
not   the   issue...   it's   the   democratic   mandate.'  (Mayor   Thornhill,   Watford, 
interview data)


























would be most  appropriate  in delivering good representation.     In Parliament MPs 
stated   their   fatigue  with   even   discussing   electoral   systems;   Van   der   Kolk  et   al 
(2004:589)  quoted Tony McNulty  MP as saying:  'In   recent  months,  we have had  




member   plurality,   alternative   vote   and   double   ballot   ­   in   the  White   Paper   that 
preceded the creation of the Greater London Authority (DETR 1997:10).  While policy 

















which an executive mayor could be elected,  with   the objective of   testing whether 
supplementary   vote   was   the   most   appropriate   option   given   the   government's 
objective of increasing turnout and legitimacy.  Given that low turnout continues to be 
a concern both of the Labour government (DETR 1998b:5, 1998g:9, 1999:5, DTLR 




The  main  section  of   the  chapter  will   review  the  27  mayoral  election  contests   to 
determine   the   political   differences   that   may   have   occurred,   particularly   where 
legitimacy was enhanced through greater turnout or through mayors receiving a wider 







































There  is  a  common understanding of   the role  of elections with  Downs (1957:36), 
Sartori   (1987a:29.141)  and  Powell   (2000:4­6)   stating   that  an  election's  goal   is   to 
produce an unequivocal winner who can then exercise office with confidence and 
legitimacy   and   to   ensure   the   victor,   in   this   case   the   executive   mayor,   is   the 



























complex   issue as  the elector  must  not  only  order  candidates according  to  which 
individual is preferred but whether they also support the political party.  For example, 
how should a person vote if they prefer candidate A as an individual but they also 
endorse  the policies of candidate B's political  party?   Possible resolutions of  this  
problem will be considered in the examination of specific electoral systems below.
The   above   method   is   usually   associated   with   the   Eighteenth   Century   French 
mathematician  Condorcet   (Black  1958:46,  Dummett  1997:48,  50).    More   recently, 
research   has  established   that   the   system was   first   advocated   by   the  Thirteenth 
Century Catalan scholar, Ramon Llull (Llull c1283a, c1283b and c1299).   Therefore, 
























Since   under   CB   the   victor   is   determined   by   aggregating   points   derived   from 
preferences,   there   is  a  concern   that  a  victor  under   this  system may  rely  on   the 
“weaker” preferences to overtake a candidate who has a large number of first and 



















Against   this,  SMP has a number of  disadvantages, especially  if  electing a single 
person to an executive post, since it is only majoritarian if there are two candidates, 
otherwise it is possible that victor could be elected on a very small share of the vote.  








41  The term first past the post normally describes the situation at a general election 
where the first party with a majority of seats wins the election, but such a goal is the 
same regardless of the election method and is inapplicable to a single executive office.
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Under SMP electors can only express a preference for a single candidate, hence it is 
is   vulnerable   to   tactical   voting,   the   phenomenon   by  which   electors   vote   for   the 
candidate they believe most likely to defeat their least preferred choice even if that 
would  not   be   their  most   desired   candidate   (Farrell   1997:163).     Tactical   voting   is 
represented as a deviation from rational choice models in which electors seek the 










government   in   the   late   Twentieth   and   early   Twenty   First   Centuries   (Magre   and 
Betrana 2007:184).  
As  with   SMP,  DB   is   vulnerable   to   fluctuations   in   turnout,   especially   if   the   two 
candidates who go through to the final round were beneficiaries of a large divided 
field in the first ballot.  While the intervening days between the two rounds of voting 
allow   additional   campaigning   in   which   the   final   candidates   convert   eliminated 
candidates' supporters, there is a danger that those without a preferred candidate in 






alternative   and   supplementary   vote   systems   as   will   be   seen   in   the   following 
paragraphs.   Mayor Arkley, who regained North Tyneside's executive mayoralty  in 








two ballots could be used by political  parties or candidates to collude or   '...adopt 
manipulative   strategies   to   try   and  maximise   their   gains...'  (Farrell   1997:49),   the 
implication being that such strategies are a negation of an elector's true preferences. 
There is also a problem for the elector in choosing for whom to vote.  By supporting 





42An initial review of the1999 and 2004 Kreisfrei mayoral elections in Nord Rhein 
Westphalen, the German Land that also adopted executive mayors shortly before the 
UK (1999) and are referred to in the 1998 White Paper (DETR 1998g:20) shows that 
there was a decline in average turnout of 7.80% from 49.38% in the first round of 
voting (n=44) to 42.21% in the second round (n=28). In 2007 the double ballot system 
was changed for a single member plurality system for the 2009 elections. 
http://www.wahlergebnisse.nrw.de/kommunalwahlen/1999/index.htm   ,   







system  it   is   advantageous   for   electors   to   use   all   their   preferences   if   there   is   a 
candidate they wish to block otherwise he or she could win through the process of 
eliminations and transfers (Dummett 1997:95).  The first preferences are counted and 







As  with   any  electoral   system  that   is   not   supported  by  compulsory  voting,  AV  is 









which  is  greater   than  the   third  and so  forth.    Yet,  AV can be effective  providing 
electors   allocate   a   preference   vote   against   every   candidate   on   the   ballot   paper 
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(Dummett 1997:95).   Moreover, that “bubbling up” received such prominence in the 






























Supplementary  vote   (SV)  was chosen as   the  method  for  electing  England's  only 
strategic mayor, the Mayor of London (schedule 2,.GLA Act 1999) and subsequently 
for all executive mayors (schedule 2, LGA 2000).  As an electoral method it appears 
to   combine   three  elements:   it   is  majoritarian,   it   encourages  candidates   to   reach 
beyond their core party political  support,  and  it  retains the simplicity of the single 
member plurality system.  If a candidate receives a majority of the votes cast on the 
first  ballot,  he or  she  is  elected.    Otherwise,  all  but   the  two candidates  with   the 

























which   was   conducted   following   four   consecutive   general   election   defeats.     SV 
benefited from having the active support of the Labour MP, Dale Campbell­Savours, 
who has been credited with the development of the system (Hansard col 649, 14­12­





(DETR 1997:ibid),   that  might  be an  indication of on­going deliberations within  the 
Labour  Party   and   government   right   up   until   the  GLA   legislation  was   enacted44. 
Indeed the Plant Report (1993:7) affirms that the recommendations were based on 
the majority views of the committee and no detail was provided as to how large that 




44That the government persisted with SV for executive mayors even after losing the first 
strategic mayoral election in May 2000 to an independent would be evidence to 
contradict path-dependency theories since these depend on feedback loops to alter 






Although   the   above   discussion   has   centred   on   the   choice   by   voters   between 
candidates, English local government is noted for its dominance by political parties, 
as Copus (2004b:14) stated:  'Where there are elections within the liberal democratic  


















45http://www.nlgn.org.uk/public/elected-mayors/mayoral-elections-referenda-results/   
accessed 23-08-2007.
46The Progressive Movement in the US is connected with the development of the first 
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the   introduction   of   non­partisan  mayors   raised   the   performance   of   councils   that 
adopted them and also improved the ethical conduct of local administration.   Such 
outcomes are significant  given  that  a number of  the English  local  authorities  that 
adopted  the  executive  mayoral  model  had previously  been beset  by  problems of 










and  Hawley   (1973:144)   suggesting   that   turnout   is   lower   in   non­partisan   than   in 
partisan local elections.   More recent studies of US local elections have also noted 
that   turnout  may be  lower  in city manager and non­partisan municipalities (Wood 
2002:223, Hajnal and Lewis 2003:650).  The US experience may by less relevant in 
England,   for   although   there   have   been   a   number   of   successful   independent 
candidates, all the mayoral elections have been contested by at least two of the three 
main political  parties (Labour  and Conservative).    A  lower  turnout  has also been 
attributed to a consequence of fewer contacts between the electors and the mayor 
and there would be less mobilisation from electioneering (Adrian 1952:768, Hajnal 
and   Lewis,   2003:647)   as   well   as   the   possible   difficulty   of   organising   election 
campaigns for electorates with more than 200,000 voters.   A third possibility is that 
(1894) and second (1915) model city charters, which sought to remove corruption and 
partisan politics from local government and replace this with more business like 




parties may  require  the expulsion of   their  members  for  helping a candidate  from 
another political party, the need for any collusion to be tacit could make the electoral  
process   less   transparent.    Yet,   in   2005  Doncaster's   Liberal  Democrats   took   the 





The  introduction  of  directly  elected  executive  mayors   in  England  occurred   in   the 
context of  concern at the low numbers of citizens choosing to participate  in  local  


































elected on a  larger  turnout,  however,   it   is  also possible   to argue  that   the victor's 
legitimacy   has   been   compromised   since   nearly   90%  of   those  who   voted   chose 

















no  second  preference  was  chosen  being  considered  as  spoilt   ballot  papers  and 
discounted.  Rallings and Thrasher (2005:xix) defined turnout as: '...the proportion of  
the electorate that cast valid ballots at the election.'     If  this more rigorous test  is 





aspect  of   the  electoral   system  to  be  considered   is  whether   the  SV system was 
benefiting the Labour Party, as was implied in the Plant Committee's models (Plant  
1993:57­59).  Systemic bias in favour of the party in power at a national level, while 
certainly  evidence of  a  political  change  resulting   from  the   introduction  of  directly 
48Source: nlgn.org.uk/mayors, Rallings and Thrasher (2002, 2005, 2006, 2007)
49The main sources are the Local Government Chronicle Local Election Centre, Plymouth 
(Rallings and Thrasher, passim), The New Local Government Network www.nlgn.org.uk 
and the individual council websites
50Since there are fewer than 30 cases, no tests for statistical significance have been 
applied but a general inference would be that turnout has not yet shown a positive 
change as a consequence of executive mayoral elections.  
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elected  mayors,  would   open  up  a  wider   debate  on  whether   such   elections  met 







had come second on the count of  first  preference votes went on to win after  the 
allocation   of   second   preferences:   Mansfield   and   Stoke­on­Trent   (2002)   North 
Tyneside  (2005)  and Doncaster   (2009).    These  results  demonstrate  that  SV was 
capable   of   delivering   different   outcomes   to   SMP   and   could   be   delivering   its 
proponents claim that it would enable more electors to help determine the outcome 
(Plant  1993:21).     In  both  Stoke­on­Trent's  and Mansfield's   first  executive  mayoral 
elections the Labour Party was disadvantaged by SV since that party's candidate was 
defeated   when   second   preference   votes   were   counted   despite   being   the   lead 
candidate   on   first   preferences.     In   both   instances   the   winner   was   also   an 
independent.    Only   in  North  Tyneside   in  2005  was   there  an  example  where   the 
Labour Party candidate moved from second to first place.  Doncaster's result in 2009 
was more interesting as not only did  it  provide a relatively new political  party, the 


















































of   the   vote   of   the   top   two   candidates   (Bullock   2002:136)   as   this   supports   the 
effectiveness of supplementary vote as a majoritarian system, with a victor's mean 
share of  the vote of 59.58%.  Taking the first and second preferences as a share of 
the  electors  who  voted,  however,   confirmed   the  earlier   findings  of  Rallings  et  al 
(2002:78) and van der Kolk et al (2004:596) that candidates tend to win on a plurality 








51Shares of vote are calculated according to Gunter et al 1998:703 using the number of 
valid votes cast
52 In multi-member councillor wards only the share for the top candidate has been 




significant  at   the   .05   level.    Therefore   the  hypothesis  H2  that  executive  mayoral 
candidates will receive proportionately more votes than victorious council candidates 
in those authorities is supported.  A similar outcome was obtained when the share of  















53  Applying statistical tests is problematic since the population of mayoral elections is 
below 30 whereas the number of council elections is over 500, since thirty is the 
threshold above which any sample is more likely to conform to a normal distribution 
and appropriate tests could be employed (Weiss and Hassett 1986:409, Hinton 
1995:53).  The methodology for small sample inferences for two population means was 
chosen (Weiss and Hassett 1986:424-426) since the focus of this research is the 
smaller of the two - directly elected mayors - with an assumption that that the 
significance level was P>0.05.   
54Applying a one-tailed t-test produces a score of 1.7006 with 27 degrees of which is just 




















into question as the Supplementary Vote system could be a necessary,  if  not  the 
sufficient, causal variable in determining the the elections' outcomes and not the will  

















modern  English   local  government,   there are   two areas where elections could  be 
different: how candidates were chosen and how they campaigned.   Here the thesis 
will   offer   a   speculative   ideal   type   and   by   a   comparative  analysis   examine  what 
changes the political parties did make.
Traditionally, candidate selection by political parties has been an internal matter.   In 
some   cases   there   were   formal   approval   processes   with   interviews   by   ward, 









An   ideal   type   for   a   mayoral   election,   one   that   addresses   the   legitimacy   and 
accountability deficits, could take the following form.   For political candidates, there 
would be selection by open primary, an election in which any registered voter could 
participate,  perhaps with  some vetting  and short   listing  by  the political  party,  but 
beyond   that   engaging  with   the  whole  electorate  across   the   local  authority.     The 







postal   ballots   of   their  members   in   the   local   authority   area.    While   in   2009   the 
Conservative   Party   conducted   an   open   primary   for   its   Totnes   Parliamentary 
selection55, such a method has yet to be applied to a mayoral candidate selection.  In 
the Labour Party the initial selection process was not without controversy as in some 
areas   candidates   were   permitted   access   to   copies   of   the   membership   roll   to 
undertake campaigning while this was denied elsewhere (Bullock 2002:134).  
Since  the election campaigns are more complex,   the  first   task  in  evaluating how 
mayoral election campaigns were fought is to choose an appropriate variable that can 
be  operationalised.    Pattie  et  al  (1995:981),   Johnston  and  Pattie   (1997:171)   and 




























telephone   canvassing   for   their   candidates   in   Torbay   since   that   was   deemed   a 
marginal parliamentary constituency.    It  will  be considered below when examining 
whether there is a local government party system what factors may be preventing 
political   parties   from   adopting   a   different   approach   over   the   use   of   second 
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In   considering   the   election   expenditure   returns   there   are   a   number   of   issues 
concerning their reliability.  First, three mayoral elections returns were missing – two 







area.    To account   for   the different  size  of  electorates,  and variations  in   the   total 






56Data for 2007 was lost when a hard drive failed
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Percentage of Legal Maximum Spent (declared) 39.10 85.13 86.17
mean percentage spent on:
offices, staff, meetings, (deposit) 6.98 3.87 3.29
computers/web design 0.65 0.15 0.15
canvassing, telephones or similar 1.83 2.74 3.00
Printing and Stationery 72.65 69.33 78.62
Advertising 6.79 6.32 6.32
Postage/paid delivery 10.78 16.73 8.62
























95% of   the  maximum amount   permitted,  Mayor  Drummond's   2005   strategy  was 
successful.   Although Drummond was re­elected in 2009 the majority was far smaller 
– just  844 votes.  The absence of a general election campaign may have hindered 
the  Labour  Party   slightly  more  as   its   candidate   slipped   to   third   place.    Another 
victorious   independent,   Mayor   Mallon,   also   did   not   reply   on   conventional 
campaigning methods and he said: 









the  full  extent  of  electronic  campaigning may not  be declared  in  election returns. 
Nevertheless,   one   practitioner,   Richards   (2004:172),   exhorted:  'If   you're   not  
57While it is legal to pay for leaflet distributor, providing the campaign does not exceed 
the legal maximum, it is illegal to pay canvassers ss 72, 111, Representation of the 





'...when you  look at   those who would prefer   to do  it  on­line  in  some way,  
whether through web­chat or email or blogs or whatever ... and through the  
NDC [New Deal for Communities] Shoreditch Trust we're piloting this kind of  
interactive TV … where, whether  it   is  reporting rubbish...or using computer  
packages though it, all that kind of thing...But at the end of the day that's been  




















59s.77 Representation of the People Act 1983 
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While this strategy did secure a majority of the first preference votes, it did not obtain 












and   Green   2005:61).     That   political   parties   have   separated   their   mayoral   and 
parliamentary   campaigns   is   also  evidence   that  executive  mayors  have  begun   to 
establish themselves as political institutions in their own right with voters capable of 
making different   choices.    Such  ability  was  demonstrated most  clearly  by  Mayor 
Drummond:















council   candidates   to   promote   its   mayoral   campaign   by   having   the   description 





from   the   Labour   Party's   council   candidates   even   though   he   acknowledged   the 
primacy of party politics at election times:
'At   election   time,   and   obviously  more   kind   of   subliminally   throughout   the  








time.   There  is  no advantage by having an election agent solely   for  the mayoral 






60 In local council elections the legal maximum for a candidate is reduced by ¾ if he or 
she is part of a joint campaign with one other candidate in that ward and by 2/3 if part 








The   conduct   of   mayoral   election   campaigns   provides   evidence   about   the 























on the same day.   Our experience of  that was that  it's been extraordinarily  
difficult.   Here of course, we were concerned to get the best result that we  
could in the general election, which was our priority.   Now frankly, finding the  
money   to   pay   for   two   campaigns,   finding   individuals   to   fight   two  different  
campaigns, you see, and if you mix the two, so in the end we didn't put up a  
candidate at all.'













local   government   boundaries.     The   Conservative   Party   tended   to   use   the 
Parliamentary constituency as its basic unit whereas the Labour Party has more of a 












win   is   both   being   more   honest   with   the   electorate   and   is   acting   rationally   to 




























to   win   a  majority   of   seats.     Lastly,   the   changing   pattern   of   council   control   is 
investigated to test whether the mayoral  election can serve as a trigger  for wider 
changes   in   local   representation   and   hence   be   an   element   of   political   change 
attributable to the introduction of executive mayors.  
Analysing   the  number  of  candidates  by  political  party   label   reveals   that  only   the 
Conservative   and   Labour   Parties   have   contested   every   mayoral   election. 
Correspondence  with   the  Conservative  Party's   election  agent   confirmed   that   the 
Conservative  Party's  Area  Officers   intervened   to  compel   the   local  association   to 
nominate a candidate in Hartlepool, indicating that this measure may be as much an 













in   decline   before   the   executive   mayoralty   was   introduced,   for   example   North 





strong  Labour  majorities  on   the   council   have  been   lost.  While   the  Labour  Party 
retained the executive mayoralty in Doncaster in 2002 and 2005, and regained Stoke­
on­Trent in 2005, it has lost badly in Mansfield in 2002 and 2007 and in Watford in 















options  instead of  voting  for   the  Conservative Party  who are  the  opposition at  a 
national level.  As such, the executive mayors were making a significant difference in 



























































sought  of  examples  where   the  previously  dominant  political  party  might   lose   the 
mayoralty and where the victors would subsequently secure their position by gaining 
an increased numbers of councillors.  There are two particular thresholds that matter. 






significant  political  change one year  after  electing an  independent mayor  by also 
electing a majority of  independent councillors allied to that mayor.    In 2005 these 
councillors former a separate political party: The Mansfield Independent Forum and 
were subsequently re­elected with the executive mayor as a majority group in 2007.





















2002* 24 (54) 14 (54) 12 (54) 4(26) Better Bedford Independent
2003 5 (18) 3 (18) 5 (18) 5 (20)
2004 5 (18) 6 (18) 5 (18) 2 (31)
2006 7 (16) 3 (18) 5 (18) 3 (19)
2007 7 (19) 3 (19) 7 (19) 2 (30) Better Bedford Independent 
2009** 9 (36) 7 (36) 13 (36) 7 (26) Independents/minor parties
Doncaster
2002 3 (22) 14 (22) 3 (8) 1 (10) Labour
2003 2 (21) 15 (21) 3 (120 1 (23)
2004* 9 (44) 27 (63) 13 (27) 14 (36)
2006 3 (18) 9 (21) 3 (10) 6 (30) Labour (2005)
2007 3 (17) 10 (21) 5 (9) 3 (24)
2008 3 (21) 8 (21) 4 (9) 6 (37)
Hackney
2002 9 (56) 45 (57) 3 (26) 0 (58) Labour
2006 9 (56) 44 (57 3 (56) 1 (52) Labour
Hartlepool
2002 2 (6) 9 (16) 3 (10) 2 (5) Independent
2003 2 (6) 6 (15) 6 (13) 3 (9)
2004** 4 (16) 25 (37) 9 (31) 9 (27)
2006 2 (7) 10 (16) 1 (15) 3 (25) Independent (2005)
2007 1 (7) 6 (16) 4 (10) 5 (20)
2008 2 (11) 7 (15) 2 (8) 4 (15)
Lewisham
2002 2 (54) 45 (54) 4 (39) 3 (48) Labour
2006 3 (54) 26 (54) 17 (54) 8 (53) Labour
Mansfield














2007 1 (6) 12 (44) 4 (8) 29 (41) Mansfield Independent 
Forum
Middlesbrough
2003 3 (7) 31 (44) 6 (20) 4 (13) Independent (2002)
2007 6 (25) 26 (43) 5 (13) 11 (26) Independent (2007)
Newham
2002 0 (31) 59 (60) 0 (7) 1 (46) Labour
2006 0 (60) 54 (60) 0 (10) 6 (107) Labour
North Tyneside
2002 7 (20) 10 (20) 3 (20) 0 (1) Conservative
2003 7 (20) 11 (20) 2 (20) 0 (1) Conservative (by­election)
2004* 27 (58) 26 (60) 7 (27) 0 (10)
2006 10 (16) 7 (20) 3 (11) 0 (5) Labour (2005)
2007 10 (18) 8 (20 3 (12) 0 (9)
2008 11 (18) 6 (16) 3 (13) 0 (6)
Stoke on Trent
2002* 6 (19) 21 (60) 11 (23) 22 (53) Independent
2003 2 (17) 11 (20) 1 (16) 6 (27)
2004 2 (20) 13 (20) 0 (1) 5 (40)
2006 2 (18) 6 (20) 3 (9) 9 (29) Labour (2005)
2007 3 (18) 7 (20) 2 (14) 8 (38)
2008 2 (16) 4 (20) 2 (14) 12 (44)
Torbay
2003 9 (36) 0 (7) 27 (36) 0 (12)
















2002 2 (12) 4 (11) 6 (12) 0 (11) Liberal Democrat
2003 1 (12) 0 (12) 10 (12) 1 (16)
2004 1 (12) 0 (12) 10 (12) 1 (12)
2006 1 (13) 1 (13) 10 (12) 1 (13)
2007 1 (12) 1 (12) 9 (12) 1 (13) Liberal Democrat (2006)













political  party  may  require  60  or  more.    The  inability   to   find  volunteers   to   come 
forward may as much be due  to national  political   issues or  a belief   that  being a 




























grounds between Conservative and Liberal  Democrats and,  more significantly,  on 
personal   grounds   between   the   Community   Group   and   Alliance   of   Independent 
















mayors have not  sought   to  form political  parties  to  contest   local  elections,  which 
would have provided them with guaranteed support on the council, whereas the latter 
two have, though only in Mansfield have they formed the majority of councillors.   In 















conclusions   to   be   drawn   about   the   political   difference   being  made,   or   not,   by 
executive mayors.  
Conclusion 
Electing   executive   mayors   was   offered   as   a   solution   to   the   problem   of   local 
government lacking legitimacy, therefore understanding the electoral system that was 












for  London's  strategic  mayor   (DETR 1997:10),   there  was  no mention  of   the   final 
system adopted, Supplementary Vote (SV).   The legislation declined to use either 
alternative vote, which had been advocated by key lobbying organisations such as 









and  2009,   there  was   some   reassurance   for  SV's   advocates  as   in   four   contests 
(Mansfield  and Stoke­on Trent  2002,  North  Tyneside 2005,  Doncaster  2009),   the 













































Measuring both  the share of   the vote and  the share of   the electorate  found  that 
executive mayors received less support that councillors.  The respective shares of the 





























been  accompanied  by   the  growth  of  a   large  number  of   independent  councillors, 
substantially reducing the Labour councillors' majority.  Having gained the mayoralty 
in   North   Tyneside   in   2005   the   Labour   Party   lost   control   of   the   council   to   the 
Conservative Party in 2008 and lost the mayoralty a year later.   Doncaster's Labour 









For all   the dominance of political parties in the mayoral election process, there  is 
evidence that the office of executive mayor has established itself as being distinctive 
in the minds of some of the electors.   The clearest case of this was in Hartlepool 










themselves.     Examining   the   electoral   system   for   executive   mayors   and   its 
consequences assists in understanding the political difference they have made by 
considering what  the process has done to address the  legitimacy deficit.    Having 






















How   executive   mayors   have   operationalised   this   ideal   will   be   investigated   by 














Constitutions  must  also  be understood  in   the  context   that  English   local  councils. 
Local authorities do not have a power of general competence but have their functions 
delimited under the legal doctrine of ultra vires; they may only undertake actions and 
functions   permitted   by   the   law   (Loughlin   1996a:45­46).     Therefore,   one   of   the 
leadership roles to be  investigated  is  the ability  of  executive mayors  to overcome 
these   constraints   and   develop   their   role   beyond   the   limitations   of   the   legal­












matter  of   indifference  to  us  all'.    One of   the  advantages of   the   reinvigoration  of 
institutional  studies64  is   that   the  study of  political   institutions  can now bridge  this 








their   drafting   and   introduction   were   left   largely   to   local   councillors   and   local 
government officers, with support through a model constitution commissioned from 
academics (DETR 2001).   Not only were they imposed on citizens, contrary to the 





the   council's   constitution.     Therefore,   it   is   possible   that   constitutions   could   be 
conceptualised as lower­order rules similar to the standing orders they supplanted, 
rather   than   being   accorded   the   higher   status   that   the  word   “constitution”  would 










In   the   case   of   executive  mayoral   councils   the   government   guidance   formula   in 
relation to summarising decision­making appears to have been largely replicated:
'...this constitution, which sets out how the Council operates, how decisions  
are made and the procedures which are followed to ensure that   these are  
efficient, transparent and that those who made the decisions are accountable  
to  local  people.'  (Bedford 2003:article 1,  DETR 2001a:13,  Hackney 2006:5, 
Newham 2006:3) 
or:
'...this constitution aims  to:    lead  to effective and efficient  Council  decision  
making make it clear to local people who is making decisions on their behalf.' 
(Lewisham 2007:23) .
As   constitutions   are  applied   to   nations,   it   has   been   argued   that   they   are  more 
appropriately  understood as a set  of  maxims  from which  the government derives 
legitimacy rather  than an  instruction manual   (Lane 1996:9).    A willingness to use 
constitutions for guidance builds on attitudes to local government law identified by 
Cooper (2000:123), who suggested that participants might be quite willing to test the 
boundaries of any  legislation rather   than consider  it  a means of   restraint.    Since 
executive  mayors  can claim  legitimacy   from having  been  elected,   seeking   to  act 
flexibly   is  evidence of   reducing  the  leadership deficit  and so  illustrates a political 
difference attributable to  the  innovative post.    The approach adopted here follows 


















abilities   to   exert   “power   to”   enable   the   council   and   its   stakeholders   to   achieve 
objectives rather than simply exercise “power over” an organisation.     As Figure 1 
(p40) illustrates, one of the key failings in local government that reforms such as the 
introduction   of   executive  mayors  was  meant   to   address  was   to   provide   visible, 
accountable leadership, of which decision­making is a core element.   Furthermore, 
variations   might   be   found   as   each   council   was   tasked   with   drafting   its   own 
constitution   prior   to   the   first  mayoral   election,   a   function   that   was   entrusted   to 
councillors, thereby allowing some differences in the powers and definitions between 
the authorities rather than simply adopting a common template.  Hence these three 
“powers”  will  be used as  the starting point   for  a  comparative  investigation of   the 
English executive mayors.
In  addition   to   this,   the section will  examine  the  consequences of   the need  for  a 
subsequent full council meeting, with at least two thirds of the councillors voting in 
favour,   to   amend   the   constitution.     Given   that   a   number   of   mayors   either   as 
independents, or as members of political parties, faced councils in which there was 
the  possibility   of   their   opponents   being  able   to  muster   the   two   thirds   vote,   one 
additional “power”  to be considered is whether the executive mayor has a veto to 






routine  affairs,  mayors'  access,  or   lack  of   it,   to  wider  powers   in  a  crisis  will   be 
considered since this could provide additional insight into how the mayor and senior 
council   officers   apply   the   constitution.     It   is   possible   that   interpretations   of   the 






two   contrasting  US   cities  –  New York  and  New  Orleans  and   how   their  mayors 
handled  their   respective  terrorist  and national  disasters – will  be undertaken with 
special attention being paid to the powers provided to them by their city charters ­ the 
equivalent of English councils' constitution.  These cities were chosen partly because 
of   their  experiences with  crises  and partly  because  they  represent   the   two most 
common types of US mayoral model that may have influenced the English idea.  The 








Understanding   how  mayors   discharge   their   office   is   important   in   evaluating   the 
degree to which they have been able to effect political change in their locality.  If they 




here:   the  extent   of   the  mayor's   powers  over   the   cabinet   and   the   impact   of   the 
decisions  made  as   identified   through   the   independent   assessment   by   the  Audit 
Commission.  
The  initial  area  to be examined  is   the allocation of  powers over   the cabinet  and 
council to the executive mayor.  ELGNCE's analysis suggests that there may be a co­
variational   relationship   between   the   powers   allocated   to   leaders   in   non­mayoral 
cabinets   and   the   performance   of   those   councils   as   measured   by   the   Audit 
Commission's CPA score, although  the relationship was stronger   in 2002  than  in 
2006 (Stoker et al 2007:15).  Yet, the theoretical basis for these correlations could be 
questioned.     If   the   three   “powers”   examined   by   ELGNCE  were   represented   as 
variables: A for the power of the executive mayor to make decisions alone, B for the 
mayor's   freedom  to  appoint   cabinet  members  and  C  for   the  mayor's   freedom  to 
allocate portfolio, the relationships could be shown in logical terms as:
A⋅B≡A⋅C≡B⋅C






mayor  may  bind  a  political   party   group   to   supporting  his  or   her  budget   and  by 
allocating portfolio responsibilities to those cabinet the mayor may have more control 
over   policy   delivery.     Such   choices   could   have   consequences   for   task 








the  three categories and  the percentage responding positively   increases over   the 




decline   in   this   category,   leaving   council   officers   as   the   anomalous   respondents 








































cabinet   briefings   or   group  meetings,   compared   to   just   5   hours   in   open   cabinet 
meetings (Stoker et aI 2004:33) which was over two hours in a private forum for every 








(Stoker  et   al  2007:78­80).     The   government   has   used   the   Comprehensive 
Performance  Assessment   (CPA)  system of   independent   inspections  by   the  Audit 





councils.     There   is   a   criticism   against   this   choice   of   a   dependent   variable   as 
performance   measurement   systems   have   been   criticised   for   encouraging 
organisations to focus only on that which will raise their score and in the long term 
this encourages only perverse effects (De Bruijn 2002:21).   There has been some 





services   when   other   investigations,   notably   the   Redcliffe­Maud   Commission, 
emphasised   'Local   government   is  more   than   the   sum  of   the   particular   services  
provided.'  (Redcliffe­Maud   1969:   para   576).     The   data   present   a   number   of 
challenges for analysis since the different tiers of local authorities were inspected at 
different   times,   with   London   Boroughs   and   unitary   authorities   receiving   more 
attention   than   second­tier   borough   and   district   councils.     There   was   a   further 
complication in that those authorities rated “poor”, as a number of mayoral authorities 
were   in   2002,   received   more   inspection   attention   and   support   from   central 
























proposal by the  full  council   to change  their powers, what shall  be termed here a 
“veto”   provision,  will   be   taken   into  account.     The   variable  will   assist   analysis   in 
situations where a mayor is an independent, or belongs to a political party facing a 
council  dominated by his opponents and can also be used as an indicator of the 
mayor's  power  in  their  own council.    Presence of  a  veto power ensures  that   the 
executive mayor retains some protection against a hostile council chamber.   It may 
also be useful  where a once dominant  local political  party was facing a changed 
environment where it controlled the executive mayoralty, but lost its majority on the 
65As drawing causal inferences becomes difficult using conventional variable-based 
methodologies on account of the small population, use will be made of Qualitative 








In  operationalising   the  data   to  analyse  executive  mayoral  authorities   there  are  a 
number of difficulties.   First,   the council  constitutions  themselves may not be  the 



















H4 Executive mayors with   two or  more of   the  three powers  (solo decision 
making, choosing cabinet members and allocating portfolios) will be be shown 
by the Comprehensive Performance Assessment to be “improving well”.










66  http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/caa/index.asp  accessed 25-10-08
67  See Ragin 1987 and 2000 , Rihoux 2006 and Rihoux et al 2003 for a more detailed 





















Bedford  0 1 1 1 0
Doncaster 0 1 1 0 0
Hartlepool 1 0 1 1 1
LB Hackney 0 1 1 1 1`
LB Lewisham 1 1 1 1 1
Mansfield 0 1 1 1 1
Middlesbrough 1 1 1 1 1
LB Newham 0 1 1 1 1
North Tyneside 0 1 1 0 0
Torbay 1 1 1 1 0









68The computer program R 2.6.1 with the QCA package devised by Adrian Duşa, 



































1 1 0 0 2 0
1 1 0 1 1 3











the   executive  mayor   to   choose   their   own   cabinet  members   or   allocate   them   to 
portfolios,  though  this may be a consequence of  the small  population of mayoral  




To   test   hypothesis  H4,   that   only   executive  mayors  with   the   three   powers   (solo 
























internal   political   processes   of   the   council   rather   than   as   a   result   of   a   wider 
engagement with the general population (Paine  1996) [1792­3]:141).   The findings 
also confirm that executive mayors have made most difference where the political 
69Ragin 2000:109 stresses that the selection of the threshold is a matter for the 
researcher.  Since the research question asks what political difference the introduction 
of executive mayors made the lowest threshold of “usually significant”, was chosen 




and allocating   their  own cabinet  members.     In   turn,   this  suggests   that   the   initial  
legislation   has  made   a   political   difference   by   diminishing   the   capabilities   of   all 
executive mayors by not ensuring these “powers” were available to all.    Executive 














taken into account especially regarding divisions within  the Labour Group.   It  has 
been suggested that the Labour members of the first cabinet in Middlesbrough were 








Losing  the  initial  election  in 2002 supports  the notion of “hurt  pride”  identified by 
Leach  et al  (2005:62).   Yet,  the Labour group had been divided since the unitary 
authority had been created in the mid 1990s with tensions between former Cleveland 
county councillors who had taken the leadership positions in the group and council 
over  those who had been councillors   just   for  Middlesbrough before and after  the 
reforms (Mackenzie,   local   journalist,   interview data).    The difficulty was  that such 




former Deputy Mayor Cllr Brady confirmed:  'Well,  first of all   it's changed from two  
years ago, completely, the old guard were reduced to two or three and new guard had  
about   25  members.'   While   not   necessarily   a   planned   outcome   of   the  mayoral 




















the  lex superior  – the supreme governance document ­  and instead has no more 
status than the previous standing orders.  The core articles appear not to change with 
these  amendments,  only   the  supporting  standing  orders  and   rules  of  procedure, 






















7.3).     No   politician   is   assigned   this   role   allowing   for   possible   confusion   and   a 
diminution both of  leadership and accountability.   Hence in Bedford the degree of 
political   change   has   also   been   reduced.     Omitting   a   designated   political 



















































H5  null  The  leadership  of  a  mayoral  authority  during  an  emergency  will   be 
carried out by council officers, not the elected mayor.
The hypothesis  might  be  known as  the   “Giuliani   test”  since  it   considers  whether 
English executive mayors have the constitutional tools to allow them to emulate the 
former New York Mayor's highly visible leadership during a crisis.   It was tested by 
examining   the  council's  own documentation,  or   the  sub­regional  emergency  plan 
where appropriate, and reviewing the media records about the authority where it has 




is  how  to  cope with  emergencies  when   there  may be pressure   for  constitutional 
safeguards to be ignored in order to address immediate needs.  Yet, as was noted by 
















of   these   authorities.     The   UK   government   asserted   the   subordination   of   local 
government to parliament within the legal framework in a concordat signed between 
the  government  and   the  Local  Government  Association  on  12  December  2007.72 
Therefore, if  local authorities have been operating in a framework that asserts the 







in  the event of a crisis  it   is  the Minister,  the elected and accountable part  of   the 
government,  who   is   the  key decision  maker   rather   than  unelected  civil   servants. 
While these executive powers are constrained, for example the Human Rights Act 









followed,  which   defines   this   link   primarily   in   terms   of   a   contractual   relationship. 
Typically the government would be perceived as the agent in this model, yet, in an 
emergency it may be necessary to reverse the roles.  Such a model of government,  
including mayoral   local  authorities, which asserts   the principle of sovereignty and 
stresses   the  need   for   the  citizen   to  obey  the   laws appears   to   resonate  with   the 
absolutist  doctrines of  Bodin  (1967  [1576]:19)  or  Hobbes  (1982[1651])   rather   than 






framework   for   the  duration  of  a  crisis,   it  should  be  remembered   that  one  of   the 
dangers   a   polity   faces   is   that   institutions   and   constitutions   play   a   key   role   in 




73S.23, Civil Contingencies Act 2004 contains a list of actions that are not permitted 
under emergency powers, for example s. 23(3) both prohibits the introduction of 









the written  text,  however,  Sunstein  (2001:9)  argued  that  constitutions can contain 
areas  of   vagueness  and  disagreement,  which  he   termed   'incompletely   theorised 
arguments'.  He also argued that a good constitution should promote deliberation and 
disagreement, though he accepted that such features may not be desirable at times 






conventions  (Lane 1996:9).    Given  the   lack  of   theoretical  models   to  assess how 
executive mayors may handle crises within their constitutions and emergency plans, 
the   research   will   return   to   the   core   normative   models   of   leadership   and 
representation to underpin the analysis.  Thus, evidence will be sought from the plans 
for   the   executive   mayors   acting   as   leaders   and   for   the   chain   of   democratic 





suggested  themselves as good comparators  for English mayoral  authorities when 
comparing   responses  to  crises.    First,   the  data   is  more accessible  since  it   is   in 
English.    Second,  US models  of  mayoral  government  have  been  cited   in  British 
academic and government literature for more than 40 years (Dearlove 1979:199­207 
source,  DoE  1991:21,  Stoker   and  Wolman  1991:7­12,   1992:242­251  Clarke  et   al 
1996:28­30).    The   relevance  of  comparative  studies  as  a  means of   investigation 
(Lijphart  1971:682­683, Peters 1998:1­3,),  means  that some examples of how US 
cities handled crises will  be considered to determine  if   there were any significant 
similarities or differences to the responses available to executive English mayors.  
Noting the hypothesis H5, that executive mayors will have the lead role in leading the 
council's   response  to an emergency,  a  number of  questions can be  investigated. 
First,   does   the   scope   of   formal   powers   allocated   to   an   executive  mayor   in   an 





















stating:  'The  mayor   shall   be   the   chief   executive   officer   of   the   city.'  (New   York 
2004:article   3).     His   or   her   control   over   senior  members   of   staff   is   also   quite 
considerable with the constitution saying:
'...a. The mayor shall appoint the heads of administrations, departments, all  
commissioners  and all  other  officers  not  elected by   the  people,  except  as  
otherwise provided by law. 
   b.        The mayor,  whenever   in his  judgement  the public  interest shall  so  









allows   for   the   circumvention   of   routine   procurement   and   probity   procedures   to 
facilitate  a prompt  response.    For  example,   it  provides  for   the suspension of   the 
normal closed tender bidding process (New York 2004:article 312, section 2).  There 
was   even   an   explicit   article   defining   the   conditions   in   which   the   emergency 
213
procurement   procedures   are   to   be   implemented,   namely:   '...in   the   case   of   an  
























subject to  legal challenge after  the event and the fear of such court  cases might 
inhibit   the authority's   freedom of  action.    Having set  out   the  formal  constitutional  
214







their   rivals   for   the  post.    Such was  the  virulence of   the condemnations of  some 
Democrat  contenders   that   the  New York Times  paid  special  attention   to   the  one 
candidate who did not join in these criticisms (Sengupta 2001).  Although Giuliani had 




the   assault,   as  well   as   his   determination   to   ensure   the   restoration  of   normality, 
Giuliani generated a wave of public support for himself.  The New York Times (01­09­
2007) published an editorial with the opening line:  'Whatever he has been before or  
will   be   in   the   future,  Mayor  Rudolph  Giuliani  became   the   leader  New York  City  
needed in its worst moment.'   The same article noted that former mayor Ed Koch, 
who had written a highly critical book about Giuliani describing him as a “Nasty Man”, 
had  also  praised  him   (New York  Times,  op.   cit.).    A  positive  media   image  was 
repeated internationally with BBC News  stating:
'...In those first few hours of bewilderment, and the following days of grief and  
horror,  New York's  Mayor  Rudy Giuliani  has been at   the centre of  events,  














order an evacuation (BBC News 2005a).    Such a failure  implied,  to use Stoker's 
terminology, that Nagin did not appreciate his “power to” role and was concerned only 
with his “power over” functions (Stoker et al 2002:8, Copus 2004a:577).   Yet, Burns 










74  Even the pattern of mayoral referendums after this incident are not conclusive.  In the 
two votes held up to one month after this attack (12th September - 12th October 2001), 
one voted yes, the other no.  Of the referendums held in the two months after the 






































Press Officer).  This  requirement  is especially necessary  if   the causation  is  




crises   are   about  management   and   not   about   political   leadership.     Second,   the 
wording of the emergency plan does not appear to have been updated since 2002 as 
there is still a reference to the leader of the council but not to the executive mayor.  
There  was  a  different   approach   in  North  Tyneside,  whose  executive  mayor  was 
identified in having a key role as the public face of the council during an emergency.  
In addition to this, there were references  in other council  documents to the office 




and other policy  implications of the emergency.   Torbay's plan was exceptional  in 










constitution  as  by  doing   so,   the   executive  would  no   longer   be   restrained  by   its 
provisions   and   thus   may   be   able   to   respond   to   the   crisis   more   speedily   and 
effectively.  Yet, executive mayoral authorities' constitutions all contain similar clauses 
regarding   the  process  of   suspending part  of   the  constitution.    First,  a  motion   to 
suspend must  be  approved by  a  Full  Council  meeting  at  which  at   least  half   the 
members  are   in  attendance;  being  dependent  on   the   council  was   similar   to   the 
position of New Orleans.    Second,  only  the procedural  rules  that  accompany the 
constitution can be suspended, not the main articles of the core constitution (Bedford 
2005a:46,  Doncaster   2005:39,  Hackney   2006:54,   Hartlepool   2006:53,   Lewisham 
2007:74,  Mansfield   2007a:39,  Middlesbrough   2006:40,   Newham   2005a:67,   North 
Tyneside 2007a:29, Torbay 2005:article 15, Watford 2005:20).  There was a particular 




while   the  role  of  the Chief  Executive may have been defined,   there might  be no 
political, accountable person from the representative side to whom citizens might turn 











application   of   law   in   the   courts   rather   than   the   interpretation   of   text   (Dicey 











stating  this  role  in  the constitution  is consistent with  the conceptualisation of  that 
document as the lex superior as well as the prime source for the citizen about how 
the council is run.   Therefore, the constitution's main articles could be reviewed to 
determine how,  if  at all,   the role of the chief executive or managing director as is 
specified.
Executive  mayors'   lack  of   a   formal   role   in   a   crisis   stands   in   contrast   to   central 
government ministers and senior councils officers who are expected to take on more 
of  a   leadership   role   raises  a  number  of  organisational  and  constitutional   issues. 
While the emergency plans were explicit in conferring significant powers on the Chief 
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The  modular   constitution   developed   to   assist   councils   in   developing   their   own 
constitutions provides a model illustrating functions and areas of responsibilities for 
officers.   Yet, the guidance omits a reference to emergency functions and in most 




urgency  to  discharge all   the   functions delegated  to  other  Chief  Officers   in  
consultation with the Mayor;'  (Hackney 2006:46)
As was noted above,   the emergency plan  itself   tended  to  specify  only   the Chief 
Executive Officer as the lead person in a major incident with no explicit mention of 
the executive mayor as a consultee (Hackney 2004b:45).  Therefore, in the event of 
an   emergency   it   would   be   significant   to   observe   which   document   was   given 
prominence:   the  Emergency  Plan  or   the  Constitution?     Indeed,   failing   to  accord 
primacy to the constitution damages its status as a lex superior and consigns it to a 







Differences   were   observed   regarding   how   mayoral   constitutions   authorise 
expenditure in an emergency and in particular, how the requirements relating to a key 
decision and access to  information were altered.   A key decision  is defined as a 
significant one, of which one month's notice should be given by the cabinet (para 8, 
SI   2000/3272).     Middlesbrough's   constitution,   whilst   not   declaring   the   Chief 
Executive's leading role in an emergency, confirmed the legal authority for officers to 
incur expenditure (Middlesbrough 2006:77).    Newham's approach was different   in 
that its constitution and rules, perhaps counter­intuitively, state that any emergency 
expenditure  is  not  to be considered as a key decision  (Newham 2006:239, 240). 






















H4  null  Executive  mayors   with   only   one   power  will   not   be   shown   by   the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment as “improving well.”








was   positively   associated  with   a   better  CPA   score,  which   echoes   the  ELGNCE 
findings (Stoker et al 2007:54), hence hypothesis H4 was supported.  Nevertheless, 
ELGNCE's   analyses   are   based   on   an   assumption   that   the   three   powers   were 
interchangeable, i.e. that an executive mayor being able to appoint cabinet members 
and assign portfolios was as important as that person being able to appoint cabinet 
members and make decisions alone.    Within  the review of  the executive mayoral 
constitutions the most significant findings came from Doncaster where the document 
was   being   used   by   both   the   Full   Council   and   the   executive   mayor   to   assert 
themselves,   as   revealed   in   the   former   claiming   the   right   to   pass   votes   of   no 











executive mayor  would want  this   responsibility   is  a  valid  question.    Yet,   from the 
perspective of  both  leadership and representation,  it   is  a concern that  the  locally 
























The analysis  provides  two additional   findings.   Firstly,   it  serves  to undermine  the 
emphasis placed on leadership in the government's white papers and in other studies 
of executive mayors.   Selznick (1957:17) has stressed that leadership matters most 
when goals are  least  well  defined,  of  which a crisis  would appear   to  be a good 
example.  Yet, this is exactly the situation where, in England, executive mayors could 
have the least role to play because of those rules.  Secondly, the constitutions are not 
acting as a  lex superior  as national constitutional theories might desire, since it  is 
possible for the reality of decision­making, if not decision­taking, to deviate from the 
written  constitution.    Nevertheless,   that   the  constitution   is  used  as  a  vehicle   for 






























In   the   previous   chapter   the   operations   of   executive  mayoral   constitutions   were 














that   the   improvements   in   local   government   that  would   occur   once   an  executive 
mayoral system was adopted would be to reduce the three “deficits” set out in the 
various White Papers, namely:














'At   the   heart   of   council   decision   taking   and   leadership   is   the   committee  
structure. It is an inefficient and opaque structure for this purpose. It results in  
councillors   spending   too  many  hours  on  often   fruitless  meetings...'  (DETR 
1998g:1.15) 
The possible  solution  offered  to   this  was  the  creation of  new political  structures, 
particularly directly elected mayors, with the aim of providing residents a clear idea 
about where decisions were being taken.   The government had already made the it 
clear   through   the  1998  White  Paper   that   decision­makers   should  be  visible   and 
identifiable  (DETR 1998g:3.2).   Since executive mayors were introduced to address 
these   perceived   shortcomings   the   following   hypothesis   can   be   offered   for 
consideration here. 







Nevertheless,   as  well   as   central   government   the  Local  Government  Association, 
which acts as the local authorities' representative body to ministers, has stressed the 



















hypothesis  was  employed   to  probe   the  degree  of  political  change   this  aspect  of 
executive mayors may have introduced.
77From April 2009 it was possible to delegate decision-making within a ward to a single 
councillor from that ward (s236 LGPIH 2007)
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H7:   The   conduct   of   the  mayoral   cabinet   will   be   different   from   pre­Local 























least   two  members.    Furthermore,   this  approach  has  already  been  employed   to 
assess the conduct of council  meetings  in  the previous committee system (Heclo 
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1969:187, Green 1981:57,).  Elcock (2001:98) argued that such debates are important 














found   of   informal  meetings   of   the   cabinet   at  most   authorities.    Kath  Nicholson, 
Lewisham's senior lawyer, was well aware of this possibility that these forums would 
usurp the constitutional decision­making process and said:   'I won't let things go to  
mayor's briefing if they look anything like decision­making.   I just say no, we're not  
having it.'  
Secondly,   were   amendments   accepted   for   debate?    The   possibility   of   cabinet 
members offering changes at the mayoral cabinet meeting might be an indication that 
real deliberation was occurring and that differences of opinion had not been “ironed 








construction   of   an   analytical   framework   to   measure   the   operation   of   mayoral 
executives.    The second section will   review cabinet meetings  to determine  if  any 
patterns   could   be   observed79.     From   this,   the   third   section  will   develop   both   a 














78This vote may be recorded as “nem con” (no-one contradicting) by the minutes or the 
chairman. 
79 Observation involved attending the cabinet meetings and noting as many aspects as 
possible from the physical layout of the meeting room to the nature of how business was 
conducted.  A core check list was used to ensure consistency of observation between 
meetings.  Sessions were also timed. (May1993, Miles and Huberman 1994:ch5, Burnham 
et al 2004:16, Bryam 2004:164)
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Before   testing  hypotheses H6 and H7,   it   is  worth  considering  the concept  of   the 
“cabinet   meeting”   and   parsing   it   to   distinguish   the   causal   combinations   or 




















and “W” within any single council  are  likely to remain stable.   The choice of “W” 
relates both  to  the work of  Weber  (1967:333­334)  from whom the concept  of   the 
rational­bureaucratic organisation is taken and also to the 1948 Wednsebury case in 
English   administrative   law,   which   established   the   precedent   that   government 
decisions   had   to   be   justified   on   the   grounds   of   “Wednesbury”   reasonableness 
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(Loughlin 1996a:249).   ”P” signifies the political context, which has been held to be 
significant  in  leadership studies (Leach and Wilson 2000:77, Leach  et al  2005:3). 
The final variables “M” and “C” relate to the two individuals who, it might be expected, 
would have the greatest influence over the conduct of the meeting. “M” signifies the 
executive mayor  while   “C”   is   the  Chief  Executive.      The  interaction of   these  two 
individuals in official and local government settings has been considered elsewhere 
(Self 1977:150­151, Svara 1990:20, Norton 1991:18­19, Mouritzen and Svara 2002:23­






As  well   as   stressing   the   need   to   create   efficient   local   government,   the   role   of 
backbench councillors in scrutinising the decision­makers was also emphasised by 
the government as part of its goal of ensuring that executive mayors were held to 
account   (DETR   1998g:26).     The  mechanism   adopted   in   the   legislation   was   to 
empower backbench councillors with a delaying mechanism whereby they could ask 





around   the   operation   of   call­in   and  what   reaction   there  was   from   the   executive 
mayors themselves.  By reviewing the operation of call­in, evidence will be obtained 
about the balance of power within the local authority, in particular, whether it has led  
to   the   strengthening   of   the   decision­makers,   especially   the   executive  mayor,   or 
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whether it has resulted in a more collaborative policy making process.  The chapter 






the   executive  mayor   and   cabinet  members   did  not   alter   their   behaviour   and   so 
introduce bias  into  the  findings (Robson 1993:191).    Sometimes  the  layout of  the 
room, or the lack of other observers or members of the public, rendered unobtrusive  












While  all   notices  of  meetings  must  be  published   in  advance   in  accordance  with 
Access to Information regulations, gaining admittance to the meeting was not always 































no  members   of   the   public   observing   the  meeting.     Since  most   of   the   cabinet 
members, the mayoral advisers and the officers faced away from the gallery, only the 


























the   information   necessary   to   understand   and   participate   in   the   decision­making 
process.  The conduct of the meetings themselves, with participants addressing each 
other by their first names and using technical language or jargon, had attributes of 
being   introverted   and   insular,   the   very   characteristics   that   the  Government   had 
sought to change (DETR 1998g: section 3).   Part of the problem was that cabinets 
consist  of  a  small   group  of  people  using  similar   language.     In   some cases   this 
familiarity was increased if all the members belonged to the same political party and 
could have spent more hours together in private meetings than in public ones (Stoker 
et al  2007:30).    Only when members of  the public were present,  such as for  the 
development related items with planning implications in Bedford and Torbay, or the 




















as  suggested  by  Riker   (1986:ix­xi).    Only   in  Bedford  was  evidence  of   the   latter 
behaviour observed as the executive mayor’s used his power as chair to determine 
whether   recommendations  were   voted  on  a  paragraph  at   a   time  or  en  bloc,   or 




and  was  not   reached  until  almost   two  and  half  hours   into   the  meeting.    That   it 
received so little attention indicates a weakness of  the cabinet system, that  it  still 















Bedford 21 7 minutes none
LB Hackney 27 2 minutes none
LB Lewisham 12 3 minutes none
LB Newham 11 (2 added) 11 minutes none
North Tyneside BC 11 (2 added) 7 minutes none








deliberative   bodies.     Green   (1981:128)   analysed   three   committee   meetings   on 
Newcastle  City  Council  and  found  that  agendas contained between 149 and 262 
items with an average of only 2 minutes being spent per item.   An earlier study by 
Heclo (1969:187) found in five observed committee meetings that councillors were 
having   to   vote   on   average   every   25   seconds   to   approve   minutes   or 
recommendations.   On the basis of this evidence, executive mayoral cabinets were 
spending more time debating fewer items than had historically been the case in the 
committee­based   local  government.    What   is  also  significant   is   that   the  mayoral 
cabinet  that spent  least  time per  item, Hackney, was also the one cabinet where 
decision­making process was closest to a committee as it had explicitly adopted a 






One  of   the   government's   objectives   in   reforming   local   authorities  was   to   create 
visible, identifiable decision­makers in local councils (DETR 1998g:para 3.2).  A year 










'14.—(1)...   any   functions   which,   under   executive   arrangements,   are   the 


























a   multi­party   cabinet,   including   a   representative   of   his   own   Better   Bedford 
Independents Party.  In Torbay, which also had a controversial issue, members of the 















using his  role  as a participant,  also noted  the  tendency of officers  to control   the 
content of reports as well  as delivering them to the meeting.    In this respect,  the 
executive mayoral system has brought about a change within each of the councils.  
The common pattern observed in all  meetings, as well as the data obtained from 
interviews   with   Mayor   Drummond   (Hartlepool)   and   Jan   Richmond   (CEO, 
Middlesbrough)  indicated that the initial part of the process involved the executive 
mayor   acting   as   chair   with   cabinet  members   presenting   reports   to   the   cabinet 
meeting   and   officers   primarily   providing   answers   to   technical   questions   only. 








where   the   cabinet   was   comprised   of   a   single   political   party,   especially   if   the 
councillors  who were  serving  on  the  cabinet  belonged  to   the  same party  as   the 
mayor.


























































































considered  is   the clarity  of   the  decision­taking process as any obfuscation again 









undertaken.   Furthermore,  the wording “report  noted” would  indicate  the enduring 
power of the norms attached to the previous committee system approach in  local 
government where such a term might have been common.  Changing the wording to 
“recommendation   accepted”,   is   an   indicator   that   the   cabinet   has   altered   its 
understanding of its own role and was embracing the notion of being an executive 
rather than just a deliberative body.  Similarly, if it was the executive mayor who was 


















recommendation,   the   term   “agreed”   was   not   used,   contrary   to   Mayor   Pipe's 
statement.    The  findings  from  the observations beg a   further  question:  why  is  a 
scarce resource ­ cabinet meeting time ­ being used just to note reports and not for 
executive decision making?   The need  to bring reports   to cabinet   for  noting  is  a 
phenomenon common to leader­cabinet councils80 as well as executive mayoral ones, 
which indicates a more systemic problem with local government decision­making that 















80Since late 2007 the researcher has been employed in the cabinet office of a borough 














were amendments   taken on  individual   items.    What  was significant  was  that   the 
mayor   did   not   intervene   to   try   and  direct   the   cabinet;   he  acted  as  a   chairman. 
Lewisham and Torbay were distinctive since  they provided examples of  individual 



















'Well,  actually,  interesting point about voting as well,  it   is very very rare for  
there to be a vote of the executive.  Usually the whole point about it really is it  
is consensus decision­making.' (Richmond, CEO, interview data)
Considering   the   second   part   of   the   second   hypothesis,   that   the   conduct   of   the 
mayoral   cabinet   will   be   different   to   pre­Local   Government   Act   2000   committee 




demonstrated   the   most   characteristics   of   openness   but   this   may   be   more   a 








cabinet   members.     Torbay's   Cabinet   also   included   a   non­Conservative   cabinet 








elsewhere,   for   example   either   in   political   party   group   meetings   or   at   informal 










unclear   (DETR   1998g:11,   DETR   1999:4,   5).     Evidence   from   the  meetings   was 
corroborated by interviews, for example Mayor Arkley (North Tyneside) described her 
approach as: 
'They  had   individual  decision  making  but   they  acted  collectively...The   lead  
member   would   present,   but,   take   it   from  me,   there   were   some   heated  
discussions, let's leave it at that.'
2. Were amendments accepted?
The  presence   of   amendments   could,   again,   support   the   conclusion   that   cabinet 
members,   including   the  executive  mayor,  were  using   the  cabinet  meeting  as   the 
decision­making forum and not just the decision­taking or ratifying one.  It might also 













Studies of   the  previous committee  system have noted how councillors  obediently 






































































strong driving   forces  in   this  borough's  cabinet.    The more  collegiate  approach  in 
Bedford was a legacy of many years’ experience of operating in a “hung” council in 
















implying   that   he  would   resolve   it   with   her   after   the  meeting.     A  more   positive 
interpretation of the Chief Executive's role here is that of supporting the executive 
mayor   in   managing   the   meeting's   business   and   preventing   the   agenda   from 
becoming bogged down on a single item.  




mayoral   candidates   in  October   2005  having   been   serving,   or   recently   defeated, 
Conservative councillors, which may have left the executive mayor vulnerable as he 
did  not  have  the automatic  support  of  one  third  of   the council   to  get  his  budget 
passed without amendments at that time82. Subsequently after the May 2007 local 
elections the executive mayor was supported by a Conservative majority.  In neither 
82The meeting in Torbay was observed in 2006, before the Conservative Party won an 
overall majority of council seats in May 2007 (Rallings and Thrasher 2007)
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North Tyneside nor Doncaster did the Labour group enjoy a majority on the council at  
the  time of  the  interviews and observations and, given  the close election results, 
cohesion and policy delivery could become key priorities to provide a solid base for  
future  elections.     In  Hartlepool   the  mayor  had  to  work  with  a   fragmented,   loose 
coalition   of   supporters   at   the   full   council   meeting.   Mayor   Drummond   acquired 
considerable   legitimacy   from   his   re­election   victory   in   2005,   but   this   did   not 
necessarily enhance his political power.  Given that this is how the executive mayor 






As  was   stated   in   chapter   one,   a   key   deficit   the   government   intended   executive 
mayors to rectify was an accountability deficit.   While part of this accountability  is 
derived from the elections, in the intervening period the government envisaged that 
non­cabinet member councillors  would exercise some restraint  over   the executive 










of councils experiencing no call­ins at all.'  (Stoker  et al 2007:14)   The same report 
concluded: 'The checks and balances introduced by the Act are working...' (Stoker et  
al  2007:16).    Earlier   findings by John and Gains (2005:20) had reached a similar 
conclusion.
If   call­in   had   been   intended   to   incorporate   non­executive   councillors   as   integral 
elements to the local authority's decision making process, the evidence from both 
officers   and   councillors   portrays   the   opposite.     Non­executive   councillors   were 
described as feeling 'alienated' according to Brown, Hartlepool's senior lawyer or as 
Cllr Headley, a Liberal Democrat councillor in Bedford, stated:








'I   think  definitely...there are still  extensive council­based work   loads...but   to  
less effect.  So before you felt that workload let you actually achieve things for  
















'I  know a  lot  of  nice Labour  councillors,   I  know some of   the Conservative  
councillors, I think people are there because they want to make a difference  
and under this system we don't make a difference.' (interview data)
Even  a  cabinet  member   in  Bedford,  Cllr  Attenborough   (Conservative),   concurred 














mayoral   councils  were   operating   in   practice,   the  different   phrases  used   in   each 
council is also a positive indicator that each local authority had taken ownership of its 

























































































































































































































































Sources:   Bedford   (2005),  Doncaster   (2005),  Hackney   (2006),  Hartlepool   (2006), 
Lewisham (2007), Mansfield (2007), Middlesbrough (2006), Newham (2006), North 
Tyneside (2007), Torbay (2005), Watford (2005)
















































































A transparent mayoral  authority makes  it   relatively easy  for  items to be called­in. 
Whether or not councillors exercise this right  is another matter.   Nevertheless, by 
being so open a noticeable political difference is being made by the adoption of the 









objective  of  more   transparent  and accountable   local  government   is  being  denied 
(DETR 1999:6).  Equally, if the call­in rules allow too many executive decisions to be 
delayed,   the   government's   objective   of   faster,   efficient   decision­making   is   also 
frustrated (DETR 1998g:19).  
The details of the political balance on the council have been added since another 






have   there   ever   been   12   non­Labour   councillors   elected   at   any   one   time.     A 
contrasting example comes from Bedford, where only three councillors need request 






not   restrict   call­in   either   to   being   an   exceptional   activity   nor   only   to   errors   in 
procedure.  
From this  evidence,   the council  constitution  is  clearly  being perceived  in mayoral 

































H7:   The   conduct   of   the  mayoral   cabinet   will   be   different   from   pre­Local 





Based   on   the   observations   of   mayoral   authorities,   a   formula   summarising   the 




for   the  possible   intervention  of  unplanned  exogenous   factors.    The   formula  was 

















there  is  evidence supporting hypothesis 6  for  more visible,  accountable decision­
making by executive mayoral cabinets or mayors.
Furthermore, those who have supported the introduction of directly elected executive 
mayors   could   take   some   encouragement   from   the   fact   that   regardless   of   these 
internal realities, the electors were identifying the executive mayor as the decision­
maker.   Mayor Thornhill said,  'People have said to me, at least we know where we  
are throwing brickbats or bouquets, we know it’s you.'   Mayor Winter made a similar 



















second   part   that   the   items   are   being   determined   in   a  more   open   fashion.   The 
constraints  of   the  political   party   group,   its  majority   and   in  particular   the  political  
history  of   the  authority  seem  to  constrain  open debate.    Hackney was  the  most 
extreme example of such constraints with the average time spent on each part of the 
agenda   being   around   1.5  minutes,   excluding   the   longest   item.    The   divergence 




























The   examples   of   individual   decision­making   remain   atypical   and,   from   an 
institutionalist   perspective,   the   survival   of   collective   responsibility   illustrates   the 
importance of participants doing what is appropriate rather than what formal rules 
may permit (March and Olson 1989:24, 1995:28,30, Peters 2005:30).
The   above   findings   stress   the   role   of   the   mayor  qua  leader   rather   than  qua 
representative.  As such, the theoretical frameworks developed by Leach and Wilson 
(2000:17) and Elcock (2000:24­25,  2001:105) with  their  emphasis on government, 
cohesion  and  programme achievement   captured   the   reality   of   executive  mayoral 































al  2005:3),   the  data  will  be  presented  as  a  series  of   case  studies   in  which   the 









council.     Even   in   a   cabinet   leader   system   it   would   require   very   exceptional 
circumstances, for example the rise of a new political party or independent group, for 
individuals with  such  little  local  government experience  to become  leaders of  the 
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council.   Nevertheless, the majority of executive mayors are drawn overwhelmingly 


























brief   overview   of   the   London   Borough   of   Hackney,   including   a   reference   to   its 
turbulent   political   history   in   the   years   immediately   preceding   the  adoption  of   an 
executive mayor.  Having established the context, the experience of Mayor Pipe and 
the  comments  of   the  other   interviewees  is  used   to  explore   the   impact  executive 
mayoral   government   has   made   on   reducing   the   leadership,   legitimacy   and 
accountability deficits identified by central government (DETR 1998g:8).   As part of 









the   balance   of   power   between   the   executive  mayor,   the   officers   and   the   other 
councillors   and   how   this   was   perceived   to   have   changed,   or   not,   since   the 
introduction of executive mayors.  
Section   two  will   repeat   the   same   analytical   framework   for  Middlesbrough.     The 
objective   is   that   by  measuring   the   same  aspects   it  will   be   possible   to   adopt   a 
comparative approach that will allow political differences to be revealed.  Indeed, the 
choice   of   the   two   councils   for   detailed   comparison  was   determined   by   a  most 
dissimilar criteria as will be shown in the CPA evidence and political history.  Overall, 
the  election  of  a  party  political  mayor   in  Hackney contrasts   interestingly  with   the 
victory of the independent candidate in Middlesbrough.
The third section offers some conclusions employing the two analytical frameworks 












Three  key   respondents   in  Hackney  agreed   to  participate,   the  most  significant  of 
whom was Mayor Jules Pipe, along with the then Councillor and Conservative group 
leader  Eric   Ollerenshaw84.     Only   one   officer   was   available   for   interview,   Jay 







Newington,   Hackney   and   Shoreditch   by   the   London   Government   Act   1963 
(Smallwood 1965:258).  It  was an area usually described as “the East End” (Audit 






socially   and   economically   deprived   wards   in   the   country   (Audit   Commission 
84Eric Ollerenshaw resigned as a councillor in November 2007 upon being selected as a 
parliamentary candidate
85Being recognised as a political party activist caused a series of research interviews 
scheduled for 2005 to be cancelled at short notice.  Fortunately, Mayor Pipe agreed to 








conceptions of  what   it   is   to  be  an ethnic  minority  as   individual  groups are often 
clustered in very limited geographical areas, for example the ultra Orthodox Jewish 
community   is  most  prevalent   in   three wards  in   the northern part  of   the  Borough 
















Although   Hackney   was   selected   because   of   its   troubled   history,   one   Labour 
councillor,  Grimble,  asserted   that  between 1986 and 1994  the  council  had made 
275
improvements,  a   change   that  had  been  acknowledged  by   the  Audit  Commission 
(LGA 1999:11).  These improvements were lost in a few years when the rival factions 
within Labour council group, proved too antagonistic and in 1996 approximately 16 
members  left   to  form  the “Hackney New Labour”  group or  join  the other  political  
parties (Leach and Wilson 2000:128­129, Bunting 2002), as a result  of  which the 
Labour Party lost control of the authority (BBC News 2002 Hackney).   The council 





the council  chamber  to  control   floor­crossing by members.   (One councillor,  
David Phillips, has sat as Labour, Hackney New Labour ­ nothing to do with  
the Blair­Mandelson version ­  Conservative,  Independent,  Liberal  Democrat  
and now Green Party.)' (Rayner 2000)
As a consequence of this, Hackney experienced a number of difficulties in trying to 







there were 16 by­elections,  however,  since the adoption of  the executive mayoral 
system  in   2002   there  have  been   just   seven87   The   impact   of   the  political   crisis 
impacted on the national Labour Party whose leader was a former Hackney resident 
and who had moved to the neighbouring borough of Islington.88   It is suggested that 
87 www.gwydir.demon.co.uk/byelections/ accessed 31-07-2009 and researcher's own notes as a 
campaigner for a political party







public   services.   The   council's   education   services  were   declared   in   1997   by   the 
government's   inspectors,   OFSTED,   to   have   collapsed   and   in   1999   central 
government  intervened  to remove the council   from  its role as the  local  education 
authority89  . Cllr Grimble (Labour) wrote of the resulting state of affairs:   'Hackney's  
credibility   is   at   an   all­time   low.   Civic   leadership   is   non­existent'  (LGA   1999:11). 




hard   and   doing   a   good   job.   ...   However,   Hackney’s   weaknesses   are  
fundamental  and considerably  outweigh  its  strengths...The Council   faces a  
deficit of up to £40m in 2000/1 if urgent action is not taken...There has not  




















take measures  to protect  key services and  tackle  the  financial  crisis   (Wilson and 
Game 2002:157), with one minister also considering taking over the entire financial 
management   of   the   council90.     Against   this   background   of   organisational   failure, 




proposal  once   the  LGA 2000  had  provided   the   legal  basis   for  executive  mayors 
resulting in the referendum in May 2002 and the first executive mayoral election in 
October 2002 (Copus 2006:26).
In   exploring   the   role   of   the   executive  mayor   as   a   political   leader   as  well   as   a  
representative, Mayor Pipe stressed the concept's multi­dimensionality by identifying 
the core representational roles of the post, namely being the community's advocate to 
the   council   as  well   as   the   council   representative   to   the  government,   along  with 
demonstrating an awareness of the potential of the role to provide cohesion within the 
majority group as well as the council itself.  Given the political history of the borough 
as summarised above,  it  may not be surprising  that  Mayor  Pipe summed up  the 
executive mayor's key role as a complex one: 










































whole  may   disadvantage   their   own   electors   (Copus   2004b:188).     An   executive 
mayoralty   has  made  a   significant  political  difference   since   the  separation  of   the 
executive mayor from the ward gave the local councillors greater freedom to articulate 
the needs of their constituents whereas under the previous committee system, the 













how   the  application  of   the  executive  mayoral   system   in  Hackney  was  delivering 
visibility and accountability.   For Mayor Pipe, the constitutional reality of collectivity 
within local government was not reflected in public attitudes.   Mayor Pipe reported 










electors.     The   cost   of   increasing   the   executive   mayor's   wider   democratic 
accountability, however, was the diminution of scope of other elected representatives, 
namely   councillors,   to   hold   him   or   her   to   account.   As   former  Cllr   Ollerenshaw 
(Conservative) observed:  '...but the only way the mayor is accountable to council is  
through the budget which is a very clumsy way of doing things'  although he also 
suggested   that  a  second  possible  axis  of  accountability  would  be   to   the  Labour 
Group of councillors. 
Another aspect of accountability explored was the possible use of unelected, non­
councillor   “deputy  mayors”  or  cabinet  members,  who would  be  appointed  by   the 
executive  mayor   as   occurs   in   the   Italian   system   (Baldini   2002:366,  Magre   and 
Betrana 2007:186).   Such appointments would mark a departure from the existing 
system where only councillors may serve in the cabinet (s.11, LGA 2000).  Mayor Pipe 
noted  that  one of  the disadvantages might  be  the  impact on  the majority  Labour 
Group, especially if those appointed were not also supporters of the Labour Party. 
Such a concern illustrates the underlying issue in Hackney of the need for a leader to 
retain  internal political  cohesion.   Nevertheless, Mayor Pipe did acknowledge  that 
such appointments  could be useful:  'If   there was a skill   that  somebody had  that  
couldn't be replicated from within the group then I would consider it in principle.'
A second dimension identified by Stoker (1995:55,63) and Stoker et al (2002:8) was 
whether   a   leader   exercised   significant   formal   power   themselves:   “concentrated 
power”,   or  whether   there  was  a   reliance  more   on   influence  or   “de­concentrated 
power”.  An area where the influential role of the executive mayor as a political leader 
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'...we  have  been   able   to   be  a   little  more   participatory  at   a   cabinet   level,  
working   with   the   management   team   in   looking   at   options,   based   on  
manifestos, the pledges we've given in the manifesto that's been written into  
the corporate plan.' (interview data)











pledge   to   take   should   you   support   us   in   the   elections.'  (Hackney   Labour  Party 
2006:2).  Therefore although the local and mayoral elections were separate from the 
point   of   view  of   election  expenses,   as  explored   in   chapter   five,   in  Hackney   the 
executive mayoral office was viewed as the dominant prize for the Labour Party, not 
council seats.  
91The imprint is a requirement from election law (s.110 Representation of the People Act 
1983, as amended) that every item of promotional material caries the name and 
address of a promoter, the candidate(s) and the printer.
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The change of  emphasis alone would signify  a major  political  difference  that   the 
office  of  executive  mayor  had  made.    The   focus  of   the  election  campaign  here 
indicates   that   the  office   of   executive  mayor   is   a   locus   of   political   power   and   it  




2000:162).     Nevertheless,   this  must   not   be   overstated   since   it   is   possible   that 
indirectly  elected group   leaders  may also  have attained  this   role  or   that  a  more 
consensual approach was adopted by some Labour groups and local parties (Game 
and Leach 1996:136). 
Another   area  considered  was   the   restriction  of   the  executive  mayor's   “power   to” 
capacity over the appointment of senior officers since the legislation reserved this 
function to councillors rather than the executive mayor.  Former Cllr Eric Ollerenshaw 


















Such a statement may be an  indication  that  in  Hackney  the  formal  power of   the 
executive mayor, his authority, may be weighed against the need for the Labour Party 
to   remain  united,   thus   illustrating   the   importance  of  historical   context   in   shaping 
institutional   behaviour   (Lowndes  and  Leach  2004:566).     It  might   also   indicate  a 
weakening of the Labour Group's power over its leaders.  If this were so, it indicates 
that  executive mayors are producing a return  to a more  traditional  model  of  elite 



















and  2001,  and  officers  were  drafting  multiple  choice   reports  with  no  clear  
direction.     And   so   bringing   in   the   mayoral   model   really   did   ...   the   re­
establishment of the idea of what is considered normal in other authorities...I  









towards   elections   in   an   attempt   to   elicit   their   core   beliefs   concerning   the  wider 
concept   of   who,   what   or   where   they   represent.     Mayor   Pipe   demonstrated   an 









property, or had their sole place of employment  in  that  local authority area (s.79, 
Local Government Act 1972).  Mayor Pipe affirmed that residency in an area ought to 























time   that   recall  mechanisms  were  not   common   in  most   other  executive  mayoral 
systems.   Recall has been a feature in a number German Länder, with incumbents 
being   defeated   mid­term,   which   resulted   in   the   creation   of   the   phrase 
















nine   through   the   experiences   of   other   councils,   such   a   threat   to   remove   the 
incumbent was present in some authorities where residents, lacking a recall option, 




A wider range of  respondents  in Middlesbrough agreed  to be  interviewed than  in 









92Four years was meant to be the standard term but some executive mayors faced a 
three and half year first term (Stoke on Trent, North Tyneside, Doncaster) while one has 
over five years (Torbay)
93Bob Brady did not seek re-election in 2007
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2001  –  which  was,  nonetheless,  significantly   lower   than   the  position   in  Hackney 
where ethnic minority communities formed 56% of the borough's population.  





the   form of   the  mayoral  system has added new credibility   to   the  council’s  
partnership with its local communities.'  (Audit Commission 2002c:p4)




but   in   1995   the   council   became   a   unitary   authority   (BBC   News   2007).     One 
immediate political problem after this change was the need for the dominant Labour 
Party to integrate two sets of councillors with there now being fewer seats and fewer  
posts   to   go   round.    The  ex­county   councillors  appear   to   have  been   successful, 
initially, in winning control of the Labour Group, however, their calibre and capability 
was questioned with former Deputy Mayor Cllr Brady describing them thus: 











to an executive mayor.    Two key  individuals were  identified as having driven  this 
concept: the former chief executive officer – John Foster, and the then leader of the 
Labour Group ­ Ken Rocker.   There were two key drivers for this reform: a political 
desire  by  some Labour  councillors   to  be  seen   to  be  embracing  change  and   so 
conforming with the desires of the Labour government, and a belief that the Labour 
Party would win the resulting election, a belief affirmed both by Cllr Budd and Sandy 







Since   this   alliance   was   not   made   public,   there   were   allegations   that   Labour 
supporters continued colluding and assisting Mallon throughout  the election  itself. 
McKenzie   recalled   a   TV   news   programme   that   showed   some   unidentified   local 
Labour party activists saying they were supporting Mallon, ordinarily an activity that 
would have ensured expulsion from the Labour Party.   Therefore, there appears to 





































unusual  given his  background  as  a  senior  police  officer,  which   is  a  hierarchical, 
disciplined structure rather than a more open commercial one.  One area where the 





In considering the above,  it  is  interesting to note Chief Executive Jan Richmond's 




representational   aspect   in   that   the   leader   has   to   discover   the   aspirations   and 
demands both of the people and of the place. There was a restrictive element in the 
tail part 'that which governance provides', which might be interpreted as restricting the 
role  of   leadership  whereas   for   local  government   to  be  a   true   form of   local   self­
government,   it  might  need  to redefine  the envelope of what  is  permitted and not 
simply work within the given framework.
Here, evidence of how the executive mayors had made a political difference can be 
seen  from  the statement   that  cabinet  meetings have become better   focused and 





overcome some of   the  errors  of   the  past  by applying   integrated approaches,   for 
example he stated how new public buildings were being planned with maintenance 
and   upkeep   built   in   whereas   before   they   had   been   left   out,   or   left   to   another 






















or   even  disciplined   for   not   following   the   group's  wishes.    Whereas   it   had  been 
suspected   that   an   executive  mayoral   system  would   enable   executive  mayors   to 
become more distant from their political parties, the data from Middlesbrough suggest 
that   the   conceptualisations   of   the   political   party   group   need   to   be   extended   to 
incorporate the impact of the new structures on cabinet members.  







group  working   in   partnership   with   the  mayor   and   executive.     Furthermore,   the 
relationship may exist only so long as the two agree on objectives and should there 
293
be  a  divergence   it  would  appear   that   the  political  party   group  would  be   largely 
powerless in this executive mayoral authority. 
An alternative explanation could be  that   the executive  mayoral  system may have 
restored the system that operated in the late 1970s where senior committee chairs 
were acting as a de facto executive.   What would be significant here is that the de 
jure  cabinet   has   strengthened   the  ability   of   the   cabinet  members   to   control   the 
political  process.   Middlesbrough's data indicated that the executive, not the party 
group, was occupying the dominant position as the new “Leviathan” and the model of 





should  be  appointed  was  considered.    Given   the  allegations   that  previous   ruling 
factions   in   the  Labour  Group  awarded  external   appointments   to   secure  votes   in 
internal   elections  and  policy   debates,   it  was  notable   the   respondents  were  also 
consistent in rejecting the notion of appointing non­councillors to cabinet positions. 










indicates   that   the   executive  mayoral   system   had   enhanced   the   authority   of   the 
executive mayor and cabinet at the expense of councillors, especially over the non­
executive members in the majority party group.  Moreover, this demonstrates that the 
executive mayor  is  so secure  that  he or she does not need  to devote significant 
resources to securing internal political cohesion.  
Mayor Mallon demonstrated a more sophisticated understanding of the concept of 
power than a narrow application of hierarchy.   Copus (2004a:577) and Stoker  et al  
(2002:4) represented power as being divided into "power over" ­ formal hierarchy ­ 







both   legitimacy   and   a   degree   of   'standing'   in   the   local   community.     Hence,   an 
executive  mayor   is  placed  on   the  same   level  as  a  director  of   ICI   (a   large   local 
employer) in a way that the previous indirectly elected leader of the council would not 










In  evaluating  changes  to   the  balance  of  power,   the   introduction  of   the  executive 
mayor in Middlesbrough appears to have had several distinct impacts.  Deputy Mayor 
Cllr Brady described how in the previous system the allocation of posts with extra 



























work   of   his   or   her   department   than  was  witnessed   from   a   committee   chair.   In 
particular, Cllr Budd stressed how decision­making had changed:
'Well,   the   other   change   that   has   happened,   which   I   hope   would   have  





one of  the government's objectives (DETR 1998g:19,  1999:6),   it  has raised some 
questions about probity.  Long, the borough solicitor, mentioned the potential problem 






































system   as   there   were   a   number   of   difficulties   in   determining   who,   if   anyone, 
controlled which “block”.   Both Mayor Pipe and Cllr Grimble's evidence assert that 
neither the chief executive nor the leader of the council had control of any of them. 
Given the size of  the over­spending and the failure of  the services under  the old 
committee system (Wilson and Game 2002:157), it  is not appropriate to allocate a 
division.    Therefore,  having  an elected executive  mayor  has  made an enormous 
difference in this local authority by, as Mayor Pipe stated, restoring what would be 
considered   normal   elsewhere   –   a   necessary   tension   between   the   political   and 
administrative heads (Self 1977:150, Mourtizen and Svara 2000:47) rather than the 
chaos of the late 1990s.  It is arguable, however, that the executive mayor is exerting 
a strong influence over  the administration.   First,   the researcher tried to make an 
appointment to see the Chief Executive, but was only offered an opportunity to speak 
to the executive mayor.   Second, the Chief Executive departed in 2007 (Doncaster  






















































earlier  pattern  and   the  concept  of   the  majority  political  party  group as  dominant  

























The analysis  of  Hackney and Middlesbrough  indicated  that  a  key change,  which 
arose from the adoption of an executive mayor was a strengthening of control over 
the authority by  the mayor and cabinet along with  the chief  executive and senior 
officers, while backbenchers were rendered less relevant.   In order to determine if 
these  changes  are  more  widely  generalisable,  data   from  the  other  nine  mayoral 
authorities:  Bedford,  Doncaster,  Hartlepool,  Lewisham, Mansfield,  Newham, North 
Tyneside, Torbay and Watford, will be reviewed.  
Constraints of time and resources mean that these councils were not investigated to 
the same degree as Hackney or  Middlesbrough,  however,  similar  questions were 
asked so as  to  facilitate comparative analysis between  these mayoral  authorities. 
These themes are used to provide a basic analytical structure.  Section one will set 
out a brief historical and geographical outline for each authority.  The second section 
will   provide   some   information   about   who   the   respondents   were.     Data   will   be 
introduced in the third section that will focus on the conceptualisation of executive 






























may  offer  evidence  of  a  significant   change  as  a  consequence  of  moving   to   the 
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a second  tier  council  with  an executive mayor   to  a unitary authority,  with  all   the 






and,  unlike some other northern English  towns,   its  population started growing by 
2006.     Although   there  were   fewer   black   and   ethnic  minority   residents   than   the 




officers,  dubbed "Donnygate",  which resulted  in  the electoral   fracture of   the once 
hegemonic   Labour  Party.     The   existence   of   several   competing   alternatives  had, 
however,  helped   the  Labour  Party   retain   the  mayoralty,   though  not  a  majority  of 




Local  Government and Public   Involvement   in  Health  Act  2007 and no change  in 
executive   arrangements   had   occurred   by   November   2009.     Another   political 
development occurred  in July 2008 with Mayor Winter being suspended from the 
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Labour  Party   and   excluded   from   re­selection   to   contest   the   2009   elections.     In 






rural  hinterland   joined   to   the  urban  coastal  areas.     It  has  suffered   from  the  de­
industrialisation of its traditional mining, manufacturing and port­based industries.  As 
a result of this, the borough was categorised as the 14 th most deprived of 345 English 








an   ardent   supporter   of   the   local   football   team   that   he  was   even   their  mascot. 
Nevertheless,  he won both  the  initial  election,  albeit  by a small  margin,  and was 
subsequently re­elected in 2005 with a sizeable majority (BBC News – Hartlepool 
2002, 2007).  Mayor Drummond successfully secured a third term in June 2009 but 







by   the  London  Government  Act   1963   from a  number  of   distinct   areas,   that   still 
retained their distinctiveness as “urban villages” (Audit Commission 2002b:8).   The 
population is ethnically diverse with over 33% belonging to ethnic minority groups and 
50% of   school   children   coming   from  these   communities.    Apart   from one   large 
commercial concern, Citibank, the local council remains one of the largest employers 




was of   interest   for   its   first  mayoral  election  because of   the  rivalries  between  the 
leader  of   the council  and Steve Bullock,  a previous council   leader and  long­term 
advocate of elected mayors (Bullock 2002:131).
Mansfield is the largest urban area in Nottinghamshire after the city of Nottingham 
itself.    With   fewer   than  5% of   the  population  coming   from ethnic  minorities,   the 














North   Tyneside   ranges   from   the   coastal   resorts   of   Northumbria   to   the   former 
dockyards along the river Tyne to former mining villages inland.  The area has good 
communications   links,   including   an   international   ferry   terminal,   and   traditional 
manufacturing jobs, which have been replaced by call centres and retail employment. 
The three­way geographical  division of  the borough was reflected  in a  three­way, 
almost   geographical   split,   in   political   representation  with   the  Conservative  Party 
tending to represent rural or resort areas, the Liberal Democrats with a small niche in 
the  old  shipyards,  and   the  Labour  Party  holding   the   rest.    Minority   communities 
formed less than 2% of the population.  The borough as whole was one of the most 
deprived in the country with 30% of the residents living in the 20% most deprived 
wards   (Audit  Commission  2007e:10).     The  Duke  of  Northumberland   remained  a 






close   to   the  wealthy  Canary  Wharf   financial   services  district.    Over  40% of   the 
population were under 25 against a London average of 31% and over 110 languages 















leader was re­elected.   The only political  change was that  the number of elected 
opposition   councillors   rose   from  one   to   six   –   three   from   the  Christian  People's 
Alliance and three from the Respect Party.
Torbay  is  an  unusual   local  authority   in   that   for  most  of   the year   it   is  one of   the 
smallest   boroughs   in   terms   of   population   in   England,   yet,   as   a   holiday   and 




young   people,   though   there  had   been  a   recent   influx  of  workers   from  new  EU 
member  states   (Audit  Commission  2007f:10).    Politically,   the  council   had  a  poor 
reputation since gaining unitary status in 1997 since by 2009 no political party had 
retained   a  majority   of   seats   at   the   subsequent   election  with   control   alternating 
between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives (BBC News ­Torbay Election 
Results 2003, 2007).  It was surprising that Torbay had not been identified earlier by 










the London Underground and Transport   for  London bus services.     It  has quite  a 
diverse population with 21% of residents coming from ethnic communities and its 
traditional manufacturing industries – brewing and printing – have been replaced by 
service   economy   employment   (Audit   Commission   2007g:8).    Watford's   previous 
Labour   Council   had   witnessed   financial   problems   with   Alistair   Robertson,   the 
Managing Director, stating:
'The   council   had   got   away   amazingly   unscathed   with   the   news   that   its  
























making them feel part of  it  and trying to come up with an outcome that  is  
satisfiable to the majority of people rather than just sort of standing up there on  
my own saying "this is where we go, and like it or lump it".'  (interview data) 
Such  a   definition  does  not   accord  with   a   “command”  or   “power  over”  model   of 
leadership, rather it resonates well with “power to” conceptualisations .  It also implied 
that the post was political, even if it was not always party political, since it framed the 
















Here,   Mayor   Arkley   was   balancing   the   leadership   and   representational   roles, 









the council...Health,   regeneration,   transport   in  my case because  I  am only  
heading a district council..' (interview data)































'I  mean what you do,  what  you do as mayor  is more or  less bound to be  
political   because   apart   from   anything   else,   there's   always   going   to   be  
somebody who is going to be watching you critically...' (interview data)
The rejection of politics may be related to Bedford's  tradition of having no overall 
control  and   it   is  noticeable   that   the  executive  mayor   is  not  even  defined  as   the 
council's   political   spokesman   (Bedford   2005:Article7.3).     Nevertheless,   Mayor 
Branston was elected as the candidate of the Better Bedford Independents Party, a 
registered political party, which has also nominated candidates for council elections. 
Cllr   Attenborough,   the  Conservative  Group   leader   and   also   a   cabinet  member, 



















own beliefs,  over  and above all  outside of   the political  doctrine.'  (interview 
data)
While  Mayor  Harrison  managed  to  stress  his  authority's  name  repeatedly,  Mayor 
Winter mentions the Labour Party  four  times  in only 113 words, which makes his 
subsequent departure from that political party in 2008 following his failure to secure 
re­selection as a mayoral  candidate,  more  interesting and more surprising (Local  
Government Chronicle, 29 May 2008).




leadership   tasks   is   to   set   the   political   agenda   for   the   organisation   (Kotter   and 
Lawrence   1974:49,   Leach   and  Wilson   2000:13,   Elcock   2001:65,   Fenwick  et   al 
2006:43), which implies that when executive mayors entered office they had some 
notion  of   the  goals   they  wished   to  achieve.  While  a  political  party  may  equip  a 
candidate with a manifesto or an ideology, an independent might lack these.  
Yet, it was not just independent or minor party candidates who were criticised for the 




described   the   policy     process   as  '...policies   get  made   in   some   little   dark   room 
somewhere in a government office.  And they get passed through government down  






Mayor   Egginton   offered   a   populist   inspiration   for   his   policies   as   part   of   his 
understanding of leadership stating: 
'I   feel   that  local political   leadership should be, certainly  to be aware of  the  
issues that are raised  locally by people. People  initially said to me when I  





national    performance  indicators,  independent  inspections and strategies to which 









(1987:7)  noted,   that  'power   to   the  people'  means power   to  'some of   the  people'. 
Another issue raised by Burton, Mansfield's senior lawyer, concerned the attitude of a 
number of   the  independent  councillors,  part  of   the Mansfield   Independent Forum 
since 2005, who stressed their role as being the “anti­establishment” element.   Yet, 




Having considered  that  some executive mayors are being elected with  at   least  a 
notion that they ought to be developing an agenda to implement, the next step is to 
investigate how they have delivered it, especially as some councils had faced political 



















severely   constrained  by   the  unwillingness  of   the   council   officers   to   change   their 
staffing arrangements to integrate more effectively with the executive mayor's office: 
'I  was always   told   that   I   couldn't  have any  extra  staff.    And  that  was   just  





had an opportunity to appoint a political assistant but I  said no, I  wanted to do it  
differently, I wanted more policy advice'.  Having been re­elected in June 2009, Mayor 
Arkley now has a second opportunity to shape the administration in North Tyneside. 


























mechanisms  they desired.    For  example,   in  Mansfield  Mayor  Egginton  (interview 
data)  oversaw  the  structural  change  that   replaced a chief  executive  with  a more 
inward­facing managing director for the council.
Over­focusing   on  the   task   accomplishment   role,   however,  might  mean   that   the 
executive mayor becomes too focused on internal administrative tasks or short term 




mayors   as   local   political   leaders  would   be   addressed   by   examining   the   priority 
attached  by  executive  mayors   to   building  and  maintaining  political  alliances  with 











Better   Beds   people   that  made   up   to   the   18   votes   needed   and   I   got   a  














member  of   the  Conservative  group  on   the  council.     Therefore,   the   institution  of 
executive   mayor   had   freed   some   incumbents   from   having   to   devote   so   many 
resources to securing political unity in the town hall. Executive mayors are having to 
devote   less   effort   to   maintaining   internal   political   cohesion   (Leach   and  Wilson 


















The   evidence   of   the   executive  mayor   concentrating   on   outward   facing   roles   is 






matrix,   to   reinforce   their  agenda   setting  and   task  accomplishment   roles.    Mayor 
Thornhill illustrated how she had been able to use her position to build alliances:





















Mansfield   borough   solicitor,   John   Burton,   suggested   that   the   introduction   of   an 
executive mayor could have led to tension with the Chief Executive since the authority 
had:  '...a Chief Executive who very much enjoyed and had developed the outward  





person   started  a  week   last  Monday.  So  we've  gone   to  slightly   a   different  






















In   reviewing   the   government's   objective   of   securing   great   accountability   (DETR 
1998:8, DETR 1999:6)  it   is  necessary to consider how this relationship has been 
addressed   from  the  perspective  of   the  participants.    The  government's  notion  of 
executive mayor as a strong, identifiable local political leader was balanced by the 




to  Schumpeter's   (1976:269)  minimalist   role  of  exercising  no  other   input   than   the 









be   reviewed.     Third,   the   approaches   to   decision­making   will   be   considered. 
ELGNCE's wider study of English local government after the introduction of the LGA 






through   being   elected   was   a   core   value   shared   by   officers   and   members 






The  value  of  electoral   legitimacy  as  a   tool  of   influence  was  echoed  by   two  law 
officers, Carol Dunn (North Tyneside) said: 'The mayor has a direct mandate from the  
public as an elected mayor' while Kath Nicholson (Lewisham) added: 





A   second  dimension  of   this   legitimacy  was   set  out   by  another   officer,  Sheehan 
(Lewisham) who noted:






relationship   as   being  mono­directional   in   that  while   executive  mayors   derive   an 
explicit  benefit   from voters  in  terms of  legitimacy and mandate,  the absence of a 
means by which voters could hold them to account other than at election time might 
be a concern.  




















'No,  I   think  it  should be the bods outside because as I  said within council  
chambers   there's   just  all   sorts  of  anomalies.     It   really   should  be  whether  
people think you're losing the plot big time. ' (interview data)
The main argument against this was that the process could be liable to abuse by 

















98Nor did Mayor Bye belong to the Conservative Group, but his interview data showed 
that one of his desires was to see a Conservative majority at the 2007 council elections 
and his campaign was supported by Conservative Campaign Headquarters in London. 
(As a member of that political party, the researcher received an invitation to conduct 

























might   lose   a   no   confidence   vote   expressed   the   greatest   concern   while   the 











scope of which was demonstrated  in chapter  five when  the electoral  system and 
results were analysed.  There it was shown that the introduction of executive mayors 





2007:221).     Having   a   single   named   person   in   charge   was   expected   by   the 
government to help change this.  Indeed, Mayor Branston (Bedford) stated that one of 











'I   think   in   terms of   leading  the  whole  community,  a  directly  elected mayor  
provides a focus.   The name that people know and can associate with and I  
think that is the advantage of a directly elected mayor.  People previously didn't  




















































Some mayors  were  already   receiving  100­200  communications  a  day,  email   and 
letters (Copus 2004a:581). Mayor Bye (Torbay) said:
'I  often  will   sit  here,   later   in   the  day,  and  go   through  30  or  40     items of  
correspondence.   What does surprise me is how much people   will expect a  
detailed response to their own local issue or their own bee in their bonnet, and  






Watford's  Mayor  Thornhill   also   reported  a  high   level   of   contact   from electors:   'I  
330
probably   get   about   200   emails   a  week.'    Using   his   previous   experience   as   an 







complaints,   they  may   not   be   aware   of   the   administrative   short­comings   of   the 
executive.  Such lack of knowledge could significantly diminish their ability to hold the 











council   system   was   slow   and   opaque   decision  making   (DETR   1998:18,   DETR 
1999:4).     It  was anticipated  that   the  introduction of directly elected mayors would 




that  three and half  years  later  they'd still  be working  for  the same person,  
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mayoral  system,  and his  new appointment   in  2006,  as an opportunity   to   try  and 
introduce more deliberation and debate into the policy­formation process.  His vehicle 
for   doing  so  was   to   emulate   the  Parliamentary  model   in  which  new  ideas  were 
introduced in a Green Paper, which was debated and then a White Paper, which was 
voted upon to determine if it became policy.  The Green Papers were used to replace 





















cabinet  might  seek  to  use one of   its   informal,  private  briefing  meetings  to  make 




















The distinction between authority and  influence has been outlined  in  reference to 





formal  authority   than may be  the case,  especially  when dealing with  other public 
authorities.  Yet, Leach and Norris (2002:26) suggested that the legislation's checks 
and balances, as well as the guidance issued, might have served to constrain this 




would  trade  that  off  with being  the council's   representative on  the regional  
assembly.' (interview data)








the executive mayor  belonging  to a different  political  party  may have allowed the 
334
Labour Group in particular to strengthen its hold over its members.  Former Cllr Hunt 








retaining   party   group   control   over   the   Conservative  member   of  Mayor  Mallon's 
cabinet.  Mayor Bye also did not report any difficulties of his Liberal Democrat cabinet 







Game   2002:155,157).     Adopting   an   elected   mayor   gave   the   local   authority   an 
opportunity to address its shortcomings, as Watford's Managing Director, Robertson, 
said: 
'Mayor comes  in May 2002, and within  three months of her coming  in,  the  
Audit Commission had come in and had a look at all this, publish a corporate  





















have been employed  to portray  the state of  affairs   in   the previous system.   The 






examples of change  in  that  the executive mayor could summon both officers and 













North  Tyneside's  Borough  Solicitor,  Dunn,  asserted   that   there  was  now a  strong 
officer team to match the equally powerful cabinet.  There was also some evidence of 
the paramount importance of the relationship between the chief executive and the 
executive mayor  with  Robertson  (Managing Director,  Watford)  stating:   'I'm one of  
those people who believes that unless the two top people work in concert, you have  
the basis for a dysfunctional authority.'   He also suggested that there should be a 










senior  officers  and  some other  officers  have contact  primarily  with   the  executive 
mayor   and   cabinet.    Backbench   councillors  may  only   be  encountered  when   the 
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was   no   single   person   identified   as   the   council's   principal   spokesperson.     The 
references  to   the   role  of   the  chief  executive  by   the   respondents,  as  well  as   the 


















2006   the  managing   director,   the   equivalent   of   chief   executive,   was   leading   an 
investigation   into   the   executive   mayor,   it   was   the   managing   director   who   was 
subsequently required to resign.   The executive mayor's power was undermined in 
























clear   indication  of   this  balance was observed by   the   researcher  at  a   full   council 











mayor  was defeated on a budget  proposal  over  a  subscription  to  the New Local 



















working   relationship  when  Mayor   Bullock   had   to   leave   the  meeting   as   he  was 
deemed to have a prejudicial interest in an item.  At this point he delegated authority  
to   the   chief   executive   and   not   to   a   deputy  mayor   or   the   cabinet,   to  make   the 
decision.103   Nevertheless,   the   fact   that   the  executive  mayor   is   the  sole  decision 
maker does indicate Mayor Bullock's dominance of Lewisham Council in a way that 
he did not achieve as leader of the council in the previous committee system.  
102Researcher's phone call to Lewisham's committee services section.







Figure   27   by   showing   an   increase   of   the  mayor's   role   over   management   and 





























104Leitch's article (2000:125-129) makes no mention of Wales, then leader of Newham, 







from   Figure   31   (p344),   the   authority   is   similar   to   others   in   that   it   has   seen   a 
movement in the locus of power away from non­executive councillors and towards the 
mayoral­chief  officer  axis.    What  is significant   is  that   this  transition has not been 
impaired by the changing context of the political party's representation on the council.  
From having a Labour Group that had a blocking two thirds majority on the council in 




longer has  to devote so much of  its  resources to recovery and a more balanced 
relationship   between   the   executive   mayor   and   the   chief   executive   has   been 













position  as   leader  would  have  been  untenable.    What   is  also  noteworthy   is   the 







party.   As with other councils,  the new system has allowed the  locus of power in 















particular  the  locus of  formal  power has moved away from backbench councillors 
towards the executive mayors and chief officers.  Nevertheless, there is an interesting 
position  in  those councils  where executive mayors do not  enjoy  the support  of  a 
majority of councillors.  In the previous committee system, or even in leader­cabinet 




organisational   stability   from   having   an   executive   mayor   in   that   officers   and 
stakeholders are all aware that the incumbent will be there for a full term of office.
The case studies in chapters eight and nine have considered the political differences 
made   by   the   introduction   of   executive   mayors   in   a   longitudinal   dimension, 
concentrating only on the changes within each authority.    In the final chapter,  the 
conclusion, the evidence of change will be summarised  both in a longitudinal and a 
comparative   form   to   assess   the   degree   of   change   and   to   determine   what 
generalisable conclusion,   if  any can be made.    These changes will  be assessed 





The   thesis   posed   the   question:   what   was   the   political   difference  made   by   the 
introduction of  directly  elected executive  mayors  since  the  Local  Government Act 
2000  to  English  local  government?    The creation  of   this   innovative   form of   local 























In   the   first   section,   the   concluding   chapter   will   review   the   theoretical   basis   for 







times  of   crisis.    While  ELGNCE's   analytical   framework   of   studying   the   council's 
constitution and the powers allocated to the mayor to appoint the cabinet members, 
allocate  portfolios  or  make  decisions  was  used  as  a  starting  point   (Stoker  et  al 
2007:54), this was augmented by examining the presence or absence of a veto power 
for the mayor over changes to the constitution.  Furthermore, the use of QCA allows 
more   scrutiny  on  which  combinations  of  powers  are  present   or   absent  whereas 
ELGNCE treats all three powers as equal and interchangeable (Stoker et al 2007:29). 




1999:6).    Section  four will  extend  the  investigation of executive mayoral  decision­
making by reviewing the conduct of cabinet meetings to determine how they were 












the  Maud  Committee   (Maud  1967:41),  by   the  1980s   the  Widdicombe  Committee 
reasserted the role of collective decision­making through the full council rather than 
endorsing   delegation   to   individual   councillors  (Widdicombe   1986:77).     Although 
Michael Heseltine raised the possibility of executive mayors in a White Paper (DoE 
1991:13),   the   concept  was   never   legislated.    Outside   government,   however,   key 
advocates such as Gerry Stoker and lobbyists such as Simon Jenkins, along with the 
Commission for Local Democracy, all served to keep the idea as part of the possible  
policy   options  (Stoker   and   Wolman   1991:19­33,   1992:251­264,   CLD   1995:54, 
Pratchett and Wilson 1996:250).  The pattern of executive mayor's development as a 
policy idea is consistent with Cohen et al's (1972:2) model of a garbage can, in which 









1999:4).     In   order   to  deliver   this,   the  government   introduced  a  novel  method  of 
elections, supplementary vote (SV), a system that was implemented initially for the 
election of  a  strategic  mayor   in  London  in  May 2000.    Since SV was so closely 
associated with the Labour Party as it had its origins in an internal policy document, 








































who voted)  and  the  higher  share   received by  councillors   in   the  same authorities 
(17.19%   and   49.91%   respectively).    While   the   finding   is   disappointing   from   the 














To   explore   the   turnout   figures   and   the   shares   of   the   vote  mayoral   candidates 
received, returns of election expenses were examined in chapter five to determine 
how mayoral candidates were approaching the task of getting elected.   There has 
been  extensive  use  of   such  analysis   in   explaining   variations   in   general   election 
turnouts (Pattie  et al  1995:981, Johnston and Pattie 1997:171,  Denver  and Hands 









105 There have been studies in the US on the mobilising effects of telephone calls, direct 
mail and canvassing, but these have mostly been conducted on a non-partisan basis, 
see Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b, 2005, Gerber Green and Green 2003, Green, 
Gerber and Nickerson, Imai 2005.  This methodology was employed by Brannan  and 




















mayors   behave   as   local   political   leaders.     The   question   can  be   asked:   did   the 
introduction of executive mayors have an impact in the balance of political power on 
the  council   itself  as  measured by  the number of  each party's  council  candidates 
elected?  Theoretically, the ability to secure the election of candidates from the same 
party is a key role for a local political leader (Elcock 2001:106).  As tables 11 and 12 
(p174,178),   indicate, such a question is  important given that a number of mayoral 
authorities (Mansfield, North Tyneside, Middlesbrough. Doncaster, and Newham) had 
long   histories   of   domination   by   the   Labour   Party,   while   another,   Hackney,   had 
354
experienced a sustained period of  no overall  control   from 1996 to 2002  following 
defections from the ruling Labour Group.   Bedford has spent nearly two decades 
without   a   single   political   party   enjoying   a   majority.     The   phenomenon   was 
investigated through the next hypothesis:















held  the mayoralty  from 2002 to 2005,  including winning a mayoral  by­election  in 
2003.   Yet, at first Mayor Morgan faced a Labour opposition with sufficient votes to 
































was  in   the manner  they executed  their  day  to day duties.     In  particular   this  was 
expected  to  be  more  efficient,  more  transparent,  and more  accountable   than  the 











scope  of   the   research   provided   a   useful   starting   point   for   comparison  with   this 
detailed   investigation   into   executive  mayors   (Gains  et   al  2005:36,   Stoker  et   al 
2007:15).   Since the thesis was examining the political differences that have arisen 











the   first   eleven  mayoral   elections   (including   for   this   purpose   the   unique   council  
manager­mayor model in Stoke­on­Trent) had seen independent or candidates from 





















Testing   the   three   powers   for   executive   mayors   using   QCA   did   not   produce   a 






not  only  has  the hypothesis  H4 not  been supported,  but  a  key weakness  in   the 








profile   terrorist   incidents   in  2005  as  well  as  an  environmental   challenge   through 
severe flooding in 2007.   It was also noted that although no causal relationship has 









is   an   example   of   a   “strong”  mayor   (Svara  1990:47)  where   the   city's   charter,   its 
constitution, specifies that the  incumbent  is  the chief administrative officer and,  in 
107 http://www.nlgn.org.uk/public/elected-mayors/mayoral-elections-referenda-results/















Formally,   therefore,   emergency   response   was   clearly   located   in   the   sphere   of 
management,   not   of   policy   or   politically   accountable   leadership   and   hence   the 
evidence  only   justified   the  null   hypothesis.    Nevertheless,   the  official   documents 
alone may not describe the full story and it will be necessary to test when a full scale 
emergency  does   occur  what   role   executive  mayors   do,   or   do   not   play   in   crisis 
response.    Formal   rules  would  not   constrain   charismatic  executive  mayors  who, 
through   force   of   personality   alone,   ensures   that   they   are   at   the   centre   of   the 
emergency response.  Equally, it is possible to conceive of an executive mayor who 
would willingly abnegate their leadership role in a crisis to the senior officials.  From 
the perspective of constitutional   theory,  leaving a degree of ambiguity  is possible 
following Sunstein's (2001:239) concept of incompletely theorised arguments.   The 
ability   of   executive   mayors   to   respond   differently   to   similar   crisis   scenarios, 
irrespective of the formal rules, would also resonate with new institutionalist theories 
that   suggest   that   actors   in   an   administration   will   follow   those   rules   that   are 
360
appropriate (March and Olsen 1984:741, 1989:22, 1995:7, Peters 2005:30).
In   assessing   the   impact   of   how   executive  mayors   respond   to   crises   from   the 







weakness   of   the   whole   reform:   the   failure   by   central   government   to   empower 
adequately   the office of  mayor   itself.     In   the approach  to crises,   the government 
exercises   a   principal­agent   conceptualisation   thereby  making   the   role   of   locally 
elected  politicians   less   important.    Yet,   this  downgrading  of   local   representatives 
would apply to indirectly elected council leaders as well as executive mayors and is 











had  made  a  political   difference   the   following   two  hypotheses  were  developed   in 
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chapter six: 





H7:   The   conduct   of   the  mayoral   cabinet   will   be   different   from   pre­Local 





















Saunders 1979:218, Green 1981:97, Elcock 1994:107).     Indeed,  the dominance of 














was   some   improvement   on   the  previous   committee   system with   the  new  model 






























who attend   the  cabinet  meetings.    As  was noted  in  Table  16  (p240),   it   is  not  a 






















group had been removed, as had been one of  the government's  intentions.   The 
evidence from the cabinet meetings observed augments what is reported below in 
the case study analysis,   that   there has been a strengthening of power along the 















restrictions  and only  a   few (Doncaster,  Hackney,  Hartlepool  and North  Tyneside) 








information   on   political   change   from   the   perspective   of   those   within   the   local 
government structure rather than from the residents' or electors' points of view.  The 










making  within  mayoral   authorities   required   conversations  with   the   council's   legal 






non­executive   councillors.     Figure   37   (p367)   summarises   the   overall   findings. 
Typically, the political change that results from the introduction of an executive mayor 













the Mansfield  Independent Forum that  retained control  of   the council   in  the 2007 
elections.    Yet,   the  executive  mayors   in   these  authorities  were  able   to   get   their 
budgets passed without amendment on most occasions and in the latter the post of 












2007).    Cllr  Maye  was   supported   by   the   leader   of   the  Alliance   of   Independent 
Councillors, Cllr Pinkney who said:  'I would like to go back to the committees, but  





let   alone   the   regulatory   and   scrutiny   committees   as   required   under   the   present 
legislation.  
To provide additional insight within each authority, Table 21 (p370) summarises the 
four   dimensions   of   Svara's   (1990:20)   dichotomy   model   –   policy,   mission, 
administration  and  management   –   to  map   the   share  of   power  exercised  by   the 
executive mayor and the chief executive.  The main political difference made by the 




capability   to   challenge   professional   officers,   contrary   to  Weber's   (1964:337­338) 
suggestion that the latter would be able to use their greater technical knowledge to 
outmanoeuvre the elected politicians.  


























Sources:  Svara  1990:20,  Figures  15  (p298),  16   (p300)  20   (p338),  22   (p339),  24 
(p340), 26 (p341), 28 (p343), 30 (p343), 32 (p344), 34 (p345), 36 (p346)
The strength of executive mayors as leaders within their  local authorities over the 
policy  making   process   also   demonstrates   a   change   from   the   operation   of   the 






intended  (DETR 199:3).    Hackney   is  omitted   from  this   table  since   the  evidence, 
particularly from Mayor Pipe, about the chaos that existed in the pre­mayoral system 
made it impossible to make any assessment about whether the politicians or officials 
















over   administrative   and   managerial   dimensions   by   redefining   the   post   of   chief 
executive as a managing director while Watford's managing director, Robinson, had 













was elected mid­term  in  a by­election,  was  there a  tension.  Mayor  Arkley  (North 
Tyneside) was a double victim in her first term as not only was she elected in a by­













party   group  meant   that   executive  mayors   enjoyed  a  degree  of   stability   in   office 
regardless of other political changes, for example their party performing badly in local  
elections.   The stability of the political leadership may also explain, in part, why the 
local   government   officers   and   stakeholders   have   consistently   expressed   greater 
satisfaction with the LGA 2000 reforms since this enables policy to be developed and 










how   the   LGA   2000   reforms   in   general,   and   the   introduction   of   directly   elected 





















(Doncaster)  Egginton (Mansfield)  and Pipe (Hackney).    At   the opposite  end,  Bye 
373
(Torbay),  Mallon   (Middlesbrough)   and  Bullock   (Lewisham)   all   indicated   the   least 
concern   for   the   internal   organisation   of   the   council.     Effectively,   the   continuum 
represents a transition from those who are mayors of the administration, to those who 
are  mayors   of   the   locality.     The   continuum   also   indicates   another   key   political 
difference that has arisen from the introduction of executive mayors.  It has freed the 






for  local  government  to continue and not  become paralysed due  to machinations 
amongst   local  politicians.    As  may  have  been expected   from  the  interview data, 
Mayor   Bullock   came   closest   to  meeting   the   anticipated  model,   a   fact   that  was 
recognised by one of his peers, Mayor Pipe.  One reassuring finding from this figure  
is   that   those mayors who come closest   to  the normative  ideal  of   faster  decision­
making   were   more   visible   to   the   electorate,   delivering   a   clear   agenda   and 






















adopting   a   true   majoritarian   system   whether   Alternative   Vote   or   the   European 
standard, double ballot.   As has been noted in the thesis, a majority of executive 
mayors   in   England   have   been   elected   when   there   were   more   wasted   second 









Another   element   was   that   local   authorities   were   not   compelled   to  move   to   an 





proposal   in   the   one   authority   area   where   they   did   do   so,   Southwark   (Copus 




local   government   that   executive  mayors   were   meant   to   deliver.     Although   the 
government   did   try   to   specify   three   deficits   to   be   overcome   lack   of   legitimacy, 
leadership and accountability (Blair 1998,11­12, DETR 1998g:9­11), the overwhelming 
political  motive  was   to  ensure   that  Labour­run  councils  did  not  pose  a   threat   to 
Labour Party's chances of winning general elections  (Wilson and Game 2002:74). 
Hence,   even   the   extension   of   powers   outlined   in   the   2008  White  Paper  makes 
negligible  progress  towards making executive mayors demonstrably  different   from 
indirectly elected council   leaders  (DCLG 2008:94).   Ultimately, England still  has a 
system of local administration rather than one of local government where Whitehall's 
inspectors   can   worry   about   the   internal   signs   within   council   offices   (Chandler 
2007:xi).   If the faults in local government were a lack of leadership, legitimacy and 
accountability, the key fault in central government is a lack of trust. 
The   research   for   this   thesis   has   explored   the   political   differences  made  by   the 
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introduction of executive mayors in England and the findings confirm that the new 
system has  had   the  most   favourable   reception  by   local  government  officers.    A 








local   government   officers   are   still  meant   to   serve   the  whole   council,   there   is   a 
separation  with   those most  closely  associated with  policy   formation  having  more 
frequent   interactions   with   the   executive   mayor   or   cabinet   members   and   only 
infrequent contact with other councillors (Stewart 2003:88­89).   What the LGA 2000 
reforms  have   done,   from   this   evidence,   is   to   create   a   formal   dominant   political 
oligarchy that interacts on a regular, if not daily, basis with a core of council officers 
and  stakeholders.    These  mayors  and  cabinets  have  greater   freedom  from non­
executive,   backbench   councillors,   therefore   administrators   encounter   fewer   “veto 


















inquiry   into   the   executive   mayor.     Hackney,   Newham   and   Middlesbrough   also 
witnessed the departure of the chief executives leading one of the main practitioner 






Where   there   are   marginal   parliamentary   constituencies   within   mayoral   local 
authorities, the political parties have been willing to invest resources.   For example, 
reviewing the returns of election expenses revealed that  both the Liberal Democrats 
and   the   Conservatives   provided   telephone   canvassing   from   their   national 
headquarters to support their candidates in Torbay's first mayoral election.   There 
was  also  a  very  distinctive  development   in  Doncaster   in  2005 where   the  Liberal 
Democrats   not   only   declined   to   nominate   a   candidate   themselves   but,   as  was 
reported in the returns of election expenses, they openly endorsed an independent 









but  to  increase his majority substantially  is evidence of a degree of sophisticated 
choice by electors that  is encouraging.    It  also  implies that  in only three and half 









which   can   be   measured   against   the   core   goals   of   effective,   transparent   and 
accountable local government (DETR 1999:6).    Voters have been able to use the 
electoral  system to choose  independent and minor party  candidates as executive 
mayors  whereas   securing   change   of   a  whole   council   through  having   councillors 
elected would have been far more difficult.   Quite literally, the colour of the political  
map has changed.  




Egginton   and  Mallon),   this   new   system   of   government   has   also   diminished   the 
privileged   place   of   political   parties   and   councillors   as   local   governors.    Holding 





After  considering   the  existing  executive  mayoral  authorities,   it   is  now possible   to 


















well as  in the wider national political   landscape.   The difference has not been as 
great   as   the   originators   intended   and   reveals   more   problems   with   Whitehall's 











second  preferences113.    His  majority   over   the  Conservative   candidate  was  2,012 
votes, but there were 10,709 unallocated second preference votes.  Hodgson secured 
37.86% of the total votes cast and 11.70% of the registered electorate's support (the 
full  result  is included in appendix C).   As such, he continued the pattern noted in 







party   success   in   the   initial   elections   as   noted   by   Leach   (2006:61)   and   Copus 
(2006:31)   has   not   been   sustained.     A   fourth   point   is   that   Hodgson's   election 






_2009.aspx additional data on the number of electors and votes cast obtained by 
telephone from the electoral services office
114 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/politics_show/8296791.stm
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Council Date R Yes % No % Type 
totals 517006 594008
Berwick Upon Tweed 07/06/01 No 3617 26.00% 10212 74.00% 64.00% With GE
Cheltenham 28/06/01 No 8083 33.00% 16602 67.00% 31.00% All Postal
Gloucester 28/06/01 No 7731 31.00% 16317 69.00% 31.00% All Postal
Watford 12/07/01 Yes 7636 52.00% 7140 48.00% 24.50% All Postal
Doncaster 20/09/01 Yes 35453 65.00% 19398 35.00% 25.00% All Postal
Kirklees 04/10/01 No 10169 27.00% 27977 73.00% 13.00% Normal
Sunderland 11/10/01 No 9593 43.00% 12209 57.00% 10.00% Normal
Hartlepool 18/10/01 Yes 10667 51.00% 10294 49.00% 31.00% All Postal
Lewisham 18/10/01 Yes 16822 51.00% 15914 49.00% 18.00% All Postal
North Tyneside 18/10/01 Yes 30262 58.00% 22296 42.00% 36.00% All Postal
Middlesbrough 18/10/01 Yes 29067 84.00% 5422 16.00% 34.00% All Postal
Sedgefield 18/10/01 No 10628 47.00% 11869 53.00% 33.30% All Postal
Brighton and Hove 18/10/01 No 22724 38.00% 37214 62.00% 32.00% All Postal
Redditch 08/11/01 No 7250 44.00% 9198 56.00% 28.30% All Postal
Durham 20/11/01 No 8327 41.00% 11974 59.00% 28.50% All Postal
Harrow 07/12/01 No 17502 42.00% 23554 58.00% 26.06% All Postal
Plymouth 24/01/02 No 29553 41.00% 42811 59.00% 39.78% All Postal
Harlow 24/01/02 No 5296 25.00% 15490 75.00% 36.38% All Postal
Newham 31/01/02 Yes 27163 68.20% 12687 31.80% 25.90% All Postal
Shepway 31/01/02 No 11357 44.00% 14438 56.00% 36.30% All Postal
Southwark 31/01/02 No 6054 31.40% 13217 68.60% 11.20% Normal
West Devon 31/01/02 No 3555 22.60% 12190 77.40% 41.80% All Postal
Bedford 21/02/02 Yes 11316 67.20% 5537 32.80% 15.50% Normal
Hackney 02/05/02 Yes 24697 58.94% 10547 41.06% 31.85% All Postal
Mansfield 02/05/02 Yes 8973 54.00% 7350 44.00% 21.04% Normal
Newcastle­under­Lyme 02/05/02 No 12912 44.00% 16468 56.00% 31.50% Normal
Oxford 02/05/02 No 14692 44.00% 18686 56.00% 33.80% Normal
Stoke­on­Trent 02/05/02 Yes 28601 58.00% 20578 42.00% 27.80% Normal
Turn Out 
388
Council Date R Yes % No % Type 
Corby 03/10/02 No 5351 46.00% 6239 53.64% 30.91% All Postal
Ealing 12/12/02 No 9454 44.80% 11655 55.20% 9.80%
Ceredigian 20/05/04 No 5.31 27.00% 14013 73.00% 36.00% N/A
Torbay 14/07/05 Yes 18074 55.00% 14682 45.00% 32.10% N/A
Isle of Wight 06/05/05 No 28786 44.00% 37097 56.00% 60.40% N/A
Fenland 15/07/05 No 5509 24.00% 17296 76.00% 33.60% N/A
Crewe and Nantwich 04/07/06 No 11808 39.00% 18786 61.00% 35.30% N/A
Darlington 27/09/07 No 7981 42.00% 11226 58.00% 24.65% N/A












Martin Winter Labour 21494 36.75% 9.95%
Andrew Burden Conservative 9000 15.39% 4.17%
Jessie Credland 8469 14.48% 3.92%
Michael Maye independent 7502 12.83% 3.47%
Graham Newman 5150 8.81% 2.38%
Terry Wilcox Independent 4036 6.90% 1.87%
Shafiq Khan Independent 2836 4.85% 1.31%
38414
Turnout 17.78%
Martin Winter Labour 25707 66.92% 11.90% 43.95%
























unused/wasted 1st preference votes










Stuart Drummond Independent 5695 29.14% 8.62%
Leo Gillen Labour 5438 27.83% 8.23%
Ian Cameron Independent 5174 26.47% 7.83%
Arthur Preece 1675 8.57% 2.54%
Stephen Close Conservative 1561 7.99% 2.36%
14187
Turnout 21.48%
Stuart Drummond Independent 7395 52.13% 11.20% 37.84%






















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Steve Bullock Labour 20011 44.95% 11.13%
Derek Stone Conservative 8004 17.98% 4.45%
Alexander Freakes 7276 16.34% 4.05%
Sinna Mani Green 5517 12.39% 3.07%
Marie-Louise Irvine 3710 8.33% 2.06%
34375
Turnout 19.12%
Steve Bullock Labour 24520 71.33% 13.64% 55.08%


























unused/wasted 1st preference votes
1st preference votes of least popular 
candidate
Council Middlesbrough





Ray Mallon Independent 26362 62.78% 25.95% 62.78%
Sylvia Connolly Labour 9653 22.99% 9.50% 22.99%
Joe Michna 3820 9.10% 3.76%
Ronald Darby Conservative 1510 3.60% 1.49%
Jeffrey Fowler 352 0.84% 0.35%
Rod Jones Independent 297 0.71% 0.29%




















Robin Wales Labour 20384 50.77% 12.94% 50.77%
Tawfique Choudhury Independent 5907 14.71% 3.75% 14.71%
Graham Postles Conservative 4635 11.55% 2.94%
Alan Craig 3649 9.09% 2.32%
Michael Davidson BNP 2881 7.18% 1.83%
Gabrielle Rolfe Green 2691 6.70% 1.71%


















Chris Morgan Conservative 21829 42.85% 18.14%
Eddie Darke Labour 19601 40.30% 17.06%
Michael Huscroft 12323 20.25% 8.57%
Allan Pond Independent 4993 8.20% 3.47%
Michael Elliott 2119 3.48% 1.47%
50614
Turnout 35.20%
Chris Morgan Conservative 26083 51.53% 18.14% 42.85%
























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Dorothy Thornhill 10954 49.41% 17.85%
Vince Muspratt Labour 4899 22.10% 7.98%
Gary Ling Conservative 4746 21.41% 7.73%
Steve Rackett Green 851 3.84% 1.39%
Paul Woodward 390 1.76% 0.64%
Tristram Cooke Fat Cat Party 330 1.49% 0.54%
18742
Turnout 30.54%
Dorothy Thornhill 13473 71.89% 21.96% 60.77%


























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Frank Branston 9557 34.48% 8.74%
Christine McHugh 4711 17.00% 4.31%
Charles Rose Conservative 4661 16.82% 4.26%
Apu Bagchi Labour 4114 14.84% 3.76%
Ian Clifton Independent 1893 6.83% 1.73%
Arthur Foster Independent 1826 6.59% 1.67%
Mark Powell Green 735 2.65% 0.67%
Gurminder Dosanjh Independent 218 0.79% 0.20%
19043
Turnout 17.42%
Frank Branston 12079 63.43% 11.05% 43.58%






























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Jules Pipe Labour 13813 41.95% 10.57%
Andrew Boff Conservative 4502 13.67% 5.00%
Paul Foot 4187 12.72% 3.20%
Ian Sharer 4185 12.71% 3.20%
Crispin Truman Green 3002 9.12% 2.30%
Bruce Spenser Hackney First 1543 4.69% 1.18%
Terry Edwards Independent 1253 3.81% 0.96%
Errol Carr Independent 441 1.34% 0.34%
21863
Turnout 16.73%
Jules Pipe Labour 16234 74.25% 12.42% 49.30%
























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Lorna Carter Labour 4773 33.99% 6.61%
Tony Egginton Independent 4150 29.55% 5.74%
Kathryn Allsop Conservative 3351 23.86% 4.64%
Phillip Smith 958 6.82% 1.33%
Michael Comerford Green 811 5.78% 1.12%
11314
Turnout 15.66%
Tony Egginton Independent 5951 52.60% 8.24% 42.38%






















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









George Stevenson Labour 9752 22.17% 5.33%
Mike Wolfe Independent 9356 21.27% 5.11%
Steven Batkin BNP 8213 18.67% 4.49%
Roger Ibbs Conservative 4417 10.04% 2.41%
Gary Snow Independent 3975 9.04% 2.17%
Fred Morrow 2408 5.47% 1.32%
Steve Breeze Independent 1349 3.07% 0.74%
Patricia Whitehouse Independent 1280 2.91% 0.70%
Graham Wilkes Independent 1157 2.63% 0.63%
David Chatton Independent 926 2.10% 0.51%
Adrian Knapper Independent 708 1.61% 0.39%
Harry Chesters Independent 453 1.03% 0.25%
25072
Turnout 13.70%
Mike Wolfe Independent 12693 50.63% 6.94% 28.85%






















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Linda Arkley Conservative 18478 43.07% 13.25%
Gordon Adam Labour 13070 30.46% 9.37%
Michael Huscroft 8404 19.59% 6.03%
Robert Batten National Front 2554 5.95% 1.83%
Louise van der Hoven 400 0.93% 0.29%
37715
Turnout 27.05%
Linda Arkley Conservative 21288 56.44% 15.27% 49.62%
























unused/wasted 1st preference votes










Martin Winter Labour 40015 36.73% 18.51%
Mick Maye Independent 27304 25.06% 12.63%
Ray Bartlett Conservative 12533 11.50% 5.80%
Jessie J Credland 10263 4.75% 4.75%
Mick Cooper Independent 7773 7.13% 3.60%
David Owen BNP 6128 5.62% 2.83%
Rick Rolt Green 4930 4.53% 2.28%
83050
Turnout 38.41%
Martin Winter Labour 45742 55.08% 21.16% 41.99%






















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Stuart Drummond Independent 14227 42.10% 20.66%
Carl Richardson Labour 5527 16.35% 8.02%
Ian Cameron Independent 4272 12.64% 6.20%
Stephen Allison 3765 11.14% 5.47%
Stan Kaiser 2701 7.99% 3.92%
John Lauderdale Independent 1821 5.39% 2.64%
Brenda Pearson Conservative 1482 4.39% 2.15%
23619
Turnout 34.29%
Stuart Drummond Independent 16912 71.60% 24.55% 50.04%






















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Linda Arkley Conservative 35467 41.85% 24.75%
John Harrison Labour 34053 40.18% 23.77%
Joan Harvey 12761 15.06% 8.91%
Nigel Batten National Front 2470 2.91% 1.72%
79918
Turnout 55.78%
John Harrison Labour 40460 50.63% 28.24% 47.74%






















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Mike Meredith Labour 27253 32.85% 15.03%
Roger Ibbs Conservative 16211 19.54% 8.94%
Mike Wolfe Green Shoots 15882 19.15% 8.76%
Steven Batkin BNP 15776 19.02% 8.70%
Gary Chevin Independent 4505 5.43% 2.48%
Justin Harvey Independent 1955 2.36% 1.08%
Gary Falconer Independent 1368 1.65% 0.75%
60091
Turnout 33.13%
Mike Meredith Labour 36961 61.51% 20.38% 44.56%




















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Nick Bye Conservative 5283 21.90% 5.15%
Nicholas Pannell 3811 15.80% 3.72%
Gordon Oliver Independent 3516 14.57% 3.43%
Susan Colley Independent 2871 11.90% 2.80%
Percy Brewis Independent 2015 8.35% 1.97%
Robert Crawford Independent 1161 4.81% 1.13%
Marshall Richie Independent 1152 4.78% 1.12%
Peter Middleton Independent 1030 4.27% 1.00%
Beverly Brennan Independent 881 3.65% 0.86%
David Pedrick-Friend Labour 767 3.18% 0.75%
James O'Dwyer Independent 647 2.68% 0.63%
Julien Parrott Independent 526 2.18% 0.51%
Beverley Oxley Independent 322 1.33% 0.31%
James Grimble Independent 143 0.59% 0.14%
12293
Turnout 11.99%
Nick Bye Conservative 7096 57.72% 6.92% 29.41%
























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Jules Pipe Labour 20830 46.86% 16.07%
Andrew Boff Conservative 7454 16.77% 5.75%
Matthew Penhaligon 4882 10.98% 3.77%
Mima Bone Green 4683 10.53% 3.61%
Hettie Peters Independent 2907 6.54% 2.24%
Dean Ryan Respect 2800 6.30% 2.16%
Monty Goldman Communist 896 2.02% 0.69%
33018
Turnout 25.48%
Jules Pipe Labour 24233 73.39% 18.70% 54.51%






















unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Steve Bullock Labour 22155 37.74% 12.45%
Christopher Maines 12398 21.12% 6.97%
James Cleverly Conservative 10790 18.38% 6.06%
Michael Keogh Green 7168 12.21% 4.03%
John Hamilton Independent 4823 8.22% 2.71%
Sinna Mani 1366 2.33% 0.77%
44018
Turnout 24.74%
Steve Bullock Labour 25129 57.09% 14.12% 42.81%



























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Robin Wales Labour 28665 47.91% 16.11%
Abdurahman Jafar Respect 12898 21.56% 7.25%
Shafi Choudhury Conservative 8822 14.75% 4.96%
Alan Craig 6559 10.96% 3.69%
Anwar Hussain 2886 4.82% 1.62%
49942
Turnout 28.07%
Robin Wales Labour 34061 68.20% 19.14% 56.93%

























unused/wasted 1st preference votes
1st preference votes of least popular 
candidate
Council Watford





Dorothy Thornhill 11963 51.16% 19.49% 51.16%
Steve O'Brien Conservative 4838 20.69% 7.88% 20.69%
Ruth Ellis Labour 4062 17.37% 6.62%
Steve Rackett Green 2522 10.78% 4.11%


















Frank Branston 15966 36.68% 14.01%
Nicky Attenborough Conservative 10710 24.61% 9.40%
Christine McHugh 10551 24.24% 9.26%
Randolph Charles Labour 4757 10.93% 4.18%
Justina Mclennan Independent 1538 3.53% 1.35%
33011
Turnout 28.97%
Frank Branston 19698 59.67% 17.29% 45.26%



























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Tony Eggington 12051 45.68% 15.62%
Joseph Meale Labour 8129 10.50% 3.59%
Aaron Beattie Conservative 2770 10.50% 3.59%
Philip Burman 1944 5.64% 1.93%
Elizabeth Button Green 1489 5.64% 1.93%
22530
Turnout 29.21%
Tony Eggington 13756 61.06% 17.83% 52.14%



























unused/wasted 1st preference votes
1st preference votes of least popular 
candidate
Council Bedford





Dave Hodgson 9428 26.83% 8.14%
Parvez Akhtar Conservative 9105 25.91% 7.86%
Apu Bagchi Independent 7631 21.71% 6.59%
Tony Hare Independent 4316 12.28% 3.73%
James Valentine Labour 3482 9.91% 3.01%
Eve Morley-Robinson Green 1183 3.37% 1.02%
25098
Turnout 21.67%
Dave Hodgson 13555 54.01% 11.70% 38.57%























unused/wasted 1st preference votes









Ray Mallon Independent 17455 58.67% 17.48% 58.67%
Joe Michna 7026 3.6 .04 23.61%
Charles Rooney Labour 3539 1 .89 3. 4
D rothy Smith Cons rvative 1733 5.82 1. 4












Turnout is calculated on the basis of good votes only; spoilt ballots are excluded
Sources
Rallings and Thrasher 2002:xiii, 187,188
Rallings and Thrasher 2005:xiv-xv








If second preference votes are used, turnout is calculated on the basis of good 







































































































































115As well as variations about when elections were held, proposed local government 
reorganisation of all the local authorities in Bedfordshire meant that the local elections 
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